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Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets: 
Federal and State Issues 
JUSTIN GUNDLACH & ROMANY WEBB 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
New York’s Clean Energy Standard (“CES”), adopted in Au-
gust 2016, aims to steer the state’s electricity sector away from car-
bon-intensive generation sources. It supports low-carbon alterna-
tives by requiring retail electricity suppliers to purchase credits, the 
proceeds from which are paid to renewable and nuclear generators. 
Recognizing that this will affect the operation of wholesale electric-
ity markets, New York’s electric transmission grid operator (the 
“New York Independent System Operator” or “NYISO”) has com-
menced a review to assess possible means of incorporating the cost 
of carbon emissions into market prices. 
This Article explores two approaches to carbon pricing in 
NYISO markets: the first would involve NYISO adopting a carbon 
price of its own initiative with a view to improving the operation of 
wholesale electricity markets (“Approach 1”), while the second 
would involve adoption of a carbon price designed to reflect and 
harmonize state-level policies aimed at reducing electricity sector 
emissions (“Approach 2”). Under either approach, NYISO would 
adopt a per megawatt hour carbon price and use it to establish a fee 
for each generating unit, consistent with its emissions profile. This 
fee would be added to the prices generators bid into the wholesale 
 
   Associate Research Scholars at Columbia Law School and Climate Law Fel-
lows at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. The authors would like 
to thank Michael Gerrard, the Andrew Sabin Professor of Professional Prac-
tice at Columbia Law School and Faculty Director of the Sabin Center for 
Climate Change Law, for his helpful advice and guidance in the drafting of 
this paper. We also thank Michael Burger, Executive Director of the Sabin 
Center for Climate Change Law, and Ari Peskoe, Senior Fellow in Electricity 
Law at the Harvard Law School Environmental Law Program Policy Initia-
tive, for their insightful comments on an early draft of this paper. 
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electricity market and those adjusted prices used by NYISO to de-
termine the dispatch order. The result would likely be a re-ordering 
of dispatch, with high-emitting generators dispatched (and paid) 
less frequently, and cleaner alternatives more frequently. 
Our proposal, while conceptually simple, is likely to be difficult 
to implement. Key issues that must be addressed before its adoption 
and implementation include: 
• Design: NYISO could derive a carbon price from the social 
cost of carbon (“SCC”), though this basis would likely be 
contentious. 
• Ensuring fairness for generators: Whether NYISO de-
rives its carbon price from the SCC or another touchstone, 
care must be taken to ensure that it does not duplicate other 
carbon pricing schemes. Some generators bidding into 
NYISO markets are already subject to carbon pricing 
through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), 
a cap-and-trade program. The carbon fee may also need to 
be adjusted to account for the value of zero-emission credits 
paid to nuclear generators under tier 3 of the CES. 
• Mitigating consumer impacts: Adoption of a carbon 
pricing scheme by NYISO would likely lead to an increase 
in wholesale electricity prices, at least in the short term. To 
offset this increase, revenues generated through carbon 
pricing should be refunded to retail electricity suppliers in 
an equitable manner, not tied to their specific purchases. 
• Providing legal justification: Any NYISO carbon pric-
ing scheme would be subject to review by FERC. The Fed-
eral Power Act confers broad authority on FERC to shape 
wholesale electricity markets to ensure that they produce 
just and reasonable rates. This paper argues that incorpo-
rating a carbon price into wholesale electricity rates—un-
der either Approach 1 or Approach 2—would be just and 
reasonable. We acknowledge, however, that Approach 1 
would push the boundaries of past market regulation, 
though in ways that are consistent with the law and with 
FERC practice. Approach 2 would fit more comfortably 
within the existing boundaries of FERC’s authority to strike 
a balance between respecting state-level public policy and 
ensuring the smooth operation of wholesale markets. 
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• Arguments supporting Approach 1: 
o Enhancing competition in wholesale energy 
markets: The current failure to price carbon under-
mines the competitiveness of wholesale markets and, 
more specifically, low-carbon generators’ participa-
tion in those markets. Adopting a carbon price, based 
on the SCC, would level the playing field for all mar-
ket participants and would be wholly consistent with 
FERC’s past efforts to improve the functioning of 
markets. 
o Ensuring proper wholesale price formation: 
FERC has emphasized that, to provide the correct in-
centives for investment, wholesale electricity rates 
must reflect the full cost of generation. Currently, 
however, market-based rates do not reflect the cost of 
carbon dioxide emissions and associated climate 
change. As the SCC would exceed costs to market par-
ticipants, its use could not be justified solely by this 
argument. Considered in isolation, this argument 
would justify a lower carbon price, based on costs to 
market participants. 
• Arguments supporting Approach 2: 
o Align wholesale markets with state-level public 
policy for the short and long term: New York has 
adopted several policies in service to its goal of decar-
bonizing the electricity sector, including three that 
impose disparate prices on a patchwork of genera-
tors. It has also articulated long-term targets for 
emissions reductions that will not be achieved with-
out the adoption of further specific policy measures. 
A carbon pricing scheme that rationalizes existing 
public policy and anticipates foreseeable changes to 
that policy would respect state authority while also 
ensuring that wholesale markets operate efficiently 
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NYSERDA 
New York Energy Research and Development Au-
thority 
OATT Open Access Transmission Tariff 
PURPA Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act 
PPTPP Public Policy Transmission Planning Process 
REC Renewable Energy Credit 
RGGI Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
RNA Reliability Needs Assessment 
RPP Reliability Planning Process 
RTO Regional Transmission Operator 
SCC Social Cost of Carbon 
SPP Southwest Power Pool 
ZEC Zero Emission Credit 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As part of its ongoing efforts to combat climate change, New 
York has committed to reduce statewide greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions by forty percent below 1990 levels by 2030 (the “40 by 30 
goal”).1 The bulk of emissions reductions are expected to come from 
the electricity sector, with the state aiming to secure fifty percent 
of its electricity needs from zero-emitting renewable generators.2 
Consistent with this goal, the state’s Clean Energy Standard 
(“CES”) requires retail electricity suppliers (“Load Serving Enti-
ties” or “LSEs”) to purchase Renewable Energy Credits (“RECs”), 
the proceeds from which will be paid to renewable generators.3 The 
CES also requires LSEs to obtain Zero-Emission Credits (“ZECs”), 
which compensate nuclear generators for their zero-emission at-
tributes.4 
Prompted in part by the adoption of the CES, the New York 
Independent System Operator (“NYISO”), a non-profit corporation 
which oversees electricity transmission and wholesale sales in New 
York, commenced a review in the fall of 2016 to assess whether and 
 
1.  N.Y. STATE ENERGY PLANNING BD., THE ENERGY TO LEAD: 2015 NEW YORK 
STATE ENERGY PLAN 112 (2015), https://perma.cc/F2B9-LTF9. 
2.  Id. 
3. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, Case No. 15-E-0302 at 14–16 
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZJZ8-WX4S [here-
inafter NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order]. 
4. Id. at 19–20. 
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how generators’ GHG emissions should be priced in wholesale elec-
tricity markets.5 The Brattle Group was engaged by NYISO to an-
alyze various emissions pricing schemes and published a report 
summarizing their likely effects in August 2017.6 Building on that 
report, this Article explores two approaches to emissions pricing in 
wholesale markets and discusses the legal implications of each. 
Wholesale electricity markets have generally treated GHG 
emissions as a wholly exogenous externality of generation, to be 
addressed—if at all—through environmental policy tools such as 
pollution control laws or temporary emerging-market subsidies for 
the nascent renewables industry.7 In our view, however, the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has authority to ap-
prove a NYISO tariff that prices-in emissions insofar as it (a) 
merely makes way for or harmonizes public policy at the state level 
or (b) can be shown to improve the functioning of wholesale mar-
kets to ensure just and reasonable rates. These two legal paths to 
emissions pricing are not mutually exclusive, but they are distinct 
and would have implications for the approach taken by NYISO. 
Both paths are rooted in the authority conferred by the Fed-
eral Power Act (“FPA”), which empowers FERC to shape wholesale 
electricity markets and steer transmission planning to ensure that 
the bulk power system delivers reliable electricity services for just 
and reasonable rates.8 Although FERC has not previously relied 
on this authority to price GHG emissions, neither the FPA’s capa-
cious language nor the judicial decisions that have interpreted it 
prevent such a step. Indeed, as explained below, we read existing 
authority as all but commanding that wholesale markets be recon-
figured to better account for the costs of emissions. 
 
5.  See generally Shawn Whites, Pricing Carbon in Wholesale Electricity Mar-
kets: RTOs/ISOs Looking at a Carbon Price to Integrate Regional Public 
Policy Goals, AG SPEAKING ENERGY (Oct. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/TF6B-
SB78 (discussing the NYISO review).  
6.  SAMUEL A. NEWELL ET AL., THE BRATTLE GRP., PRICING CARBON INTO NYISO’S 
WHOLESALE ENERGY MARKET TO SUPPORT NEW YORK’S DECARBONIZATION 
GOALS (2017), https://perma.cc/QH8S-6X9R.  
7.  See Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(“[Potential] siting, health, safety, environmental [or] archeological prob-
lems . . . [are] beyond the Commission’s authority to consider under sections 
205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act.”). 
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The authors recognize that one of our proposed paths to pric-
ing emissions—which would see NYISO adopting an emissions 
price of its own initiative with a view to improving the operation of 
wholesale electricity markets—would push the boundaries of what 
has to date been considered the limit of FERC’s authority. Many 
view climate change as an environmental externality whose at-
tendant costs lay beyond the scope of what ought to inform FERC’s 
assessment of wholesale rates’ justness and reasonableness.9 We 
argue, however, that climate change and the GHG emissions that 
cause it materially affect the wholesale energy market. The carbon 
pricing scheme we propose would ensure that those effects are 
properly accounted for in market prices. The proposal would, like 
several other recent orders, enhance competition and improve 
price formation. It would also support effective planning. 
The fact that the FPA does not expressly authorize emissions 
pricing in wholesale markets is not fatal. FERC has, in the past, 
taken steps not contemplated in the FPA. The establishment of 
wholesale markets is a good example. At the time the FPA was 
enacted, electricity services were provided by vertically integrated 
utilities.10 Markets evolved gradually over time, as a result of var-
ious FERC actions, beginning with the adoption of Order 888 in 
1996.11 That order laid the groundwork for competitive energy 
markets by requiring utilities to provide “open access” transmis-
sion services to unaffiliated generators.12 The order is widely con-
sidered a response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which author-
ized FERC to order individual utilities to provide transmission 
 
9.  See Todd S. Aagard, Energy-Environment Policy Alignments, 90 WASH. L. 
REV. 1517, 1546 (2015) (“Broadening FERC’s authority to encompass exter-
nalities and other market failures . . . would fundamentally re-orient the 
agency in ways that would likely generate significant opposition from both 
inside and outside the agency—and perhaps from courts as well.”); John S. 
Moot, Subsidies, Climate Change, Electric Markets and the FERC, 35 
ENERGY L.J. 345, 348 (2014) (stating without explanation that ignoring gen-
erators’ GHG emissions is “fuel-neutral”); ERIC FILIPINK, NAT’L REGULATORY 
RESEARCH INST., SERVING THE “PUBLIC INTEREST” — TRADITIONAL VS 
EXPANSIVE UTILITY REGULATION NO. 10-02 (2009), https://perma.cc/UMU7-
WKXN (discussing aspects of issue in retail market context). 
10.  See generally New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002). 
11.  Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of 
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 38). 
12. Id. at 4. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1
   
2017] Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets 9 
services on a case-by-case basis.13 Crucially, however, it is the FPA 
and not the 1992 Act that provides the legal basis for FERC’s cre-
ation of wholesale markets.14 Indeed, FERC went beyond what the 
1992 Act required after recognizing that the process it prescribed 
would be too costly and time-consuming to ensure just and reason-
able rates.15 
This paper proceeds as follows: Parts 2, 3, and 4 provide back-
ground on electricity infrastructure, wholesale markets, and car-
bon pricing respectively—topics that are likely familiar for some 
readers. Part 5 briefly discusses New York State’s current carbon 
pricing programs, which are designed to operate outside the whole-
sale electricity market. Part 6 explores mechanisms NYISO could 
employ to implement a carbon price in the wholesale market. And 
Part 7 offers arguments that could be presented in support of a 
NYISO carbon price proposal to FERC. 
II. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 101 
Electricity services were historically provided by vertically in-
tegrated utilities, which owned generating units as well as trans-
mission and distribution infrastructure.16 Each utility operated as 
a regulated monopoly, selling electricity within an exclusive ser-
vice territory.17 Regulation of electricity sales was—and still is—
shared between the federal government and the states.18 At the 
federal level, FERC is authorized to regulate the transmission and 
wholesale sale of electricity in interstate commerce under the 
FPA.19 The FPA defines wholesale sales as sales of electricity “to 
 
13.  See, e.g., Marcel A. Lamoureux, FERC’s Impact on Electric Utilities, 8 IEEE 
POWER ENG’G REV. 8 (2001) (“As a direct result of the Energy Policy Act of 
1992, FERC issued Orders 888 and 889 in 1996.”).  
14.  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 11 (2002) (“Rather than grounding its legal 
authority [to issue Order 888] in Congress’ more recent electricity legisla-
tion, FERC cited §§ 205–206 of the 1935 FPA—the provisions concerning 
FERC’s power to remedy unduly discriminatory practices—as providing the 
authority for its rulemaking. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d–824e.”). 
15.  Id. at 11–14. 
16.  See generally New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002). 
17.  Id. 
18.  16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012). See also Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 
376 U.S. 205 (1964). 
19.  16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b) (2012) (providing for federal regulation of the “trans-
mission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy 
at wholesale in interstate commerce”).  
9
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any person for resale.”20 Those sales are considered to occur in “in-
terstate commerce” whenever electricity is transmitted via an in-
terstate grid.21 Where transmission occurs via an intrastate grid, 
the sale is not subject to regulation by FERC, but may be regulated 
by the state in which it occurs.22 The states also regulate retail 
electricity sales.23 
In the contiguous U.S., electricity is transmitted via three 
main synchronous grids, namely: 
1. the Eastern Interconnection, which extends from central 
Canada south to Florida and includes all U.S. territory 
east of the Great Plains, except parts of Texas and Maine; 
2. the Western Interconnection, which extends from western 
Canada south to Mexico and includes all U.S. territory 
west of the Great Plains; and 
3. the Texas Interconnection, which covers most of Texas.24 
As the Eastern and Western Interconnections cross state bor-
ders, electricity transmission thereon is considered to occur in in-
terstate commerce, subjecting it to regulation by FERC.25 FERC’s 
regulatory duties include ensuring that wholesale electricity rates 
are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or prefer-
ential, and that the bulk power system operates reliably.26 
 
20.  Id. § 824(d). 
21.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 461 (1972). 
22.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). See also S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205. 
23.  S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205. 
24.  Learn More About Interconnections, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
https://perma.cc/S688-5L7T. 
25.  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2002). 
26.  16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (requiring that “[a]ll rates and charges made, demanded, 
or received by any public utility for . . . [the] sale of electric energy subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . shall be just and reasonable, and 
any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to 
be unlawful”); § 824d(b) (providing that “[n]o public utility shall, with re-
spect to any . . . sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make 
or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any 
person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage”); § 824d(e) (authorizing 
FERC to conduct “a hearing concerning the lawfulness of” any rate or 
charge); § 824e(a) (requiring FERC, when it determines that a rate or 
change “is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential . . . 
[to] determine the just and reasonable rate” or charge); § 824o (providing 
FERC with authority to enforce “reliability standards” via “Electric Relia-
bility Organizations” certified by FERC).  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1
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Figure 1: Transmission Interconnections in the 
Continental U.S.27 
 
For most of the 20th century, FERC regulated wholesale elec-
tricity rates exclusively on a cost-of-service basis, under which util-
ities were permitted to recover the prudent expenses they incurred 
in providing services, plus a reasonable return on capital.28 Re-
cently, however, FERC has increasingly relied on markets to set 
rates. This shift began in the late 1980s, with FERC issuing a se-
ries of market-based rate authorizations which exempt utilities 
and other suppliers from cost-of-service regulation, allowing them 
to sell electricity at market-based rates. 
A. The Evolution of Wholesale Electricity Markets 
Historically, vertically-integrated utilities produced electricity 
through self-supply (i.e., by constructing their own generating 
units).29 Utilities also entered into long-term bilateral contracts to 
 
27.  Matt Kasper, How to Secure the Grid and Save Ratepayers Money, ENERGY 
& POLICY INSTITUTE, https://perma.cc/C3PP-FY77. 
28.  JAMES H. MCGREW, FERC: FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 179 
(2d ed. 2009). 
29.  FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 659 (2000). 
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purchase electricity from independently owned generating units.30 
Such bilateral contracts are still widely used to procure electricity 
today; procurement also occurs through wholesale spot markets in 
some areas.31 
The origins of wholesale markets can be traced back to the en-
ergy crisis of the 1970s. In response to the crisis, Congress enacted 
the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”)32 to 
incentivize alternative means of electricity generation, among 
other things. PURPA led to the construction of hundreds of mer-
chant generating facilities, the owners of which demanded access 
to the utility-owned transmission grid to transport their electricity 
to retailers and/or consumers.33 In response to those demands, 
Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992,34 which author-
ized FERC to order individual utilities to provide transmission ser-
vices to merchant generators.35 After issuing twelve such orders in 
twelve separate proceedings, FERC determined that this case-by-
case approach was too costly and time-consuming to provide an ad-
equate remedy for undue discrimination.36 Thus, in 1996, it issued 
Orders 88837 and 889 requiring all utilities to provide “open access” 
transmission services.38 
Orders 888 and 889 aimed to, among other things, enhance 
merchant generators’ access to electric utilities’ transmission in-
frastructure.39 Utilities were required to unbundle electricity 
transmission from sales40 and act as common carriers, providing 
 
30.  Id. at 671. 
31.  Id. at 671, 787. 
32.  Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)).  
33.  BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 718–19. 
34.  Energy Policy Act of 1993, Pub. L. 102-486; 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
35.  16 U.S.C. § 824j. 
36.  For a discussion of this issue, see New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 9–14 (2002). 
37.  Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of 
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). 
38. Order No. 889, Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly 
Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,736 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). 
39. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,540.  
40. Id. at 21,525–29.  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1
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transmission services to both affiliated and non-affiliated compa-
nies on a non-discriminatory basis.41 FERC suggested that utilities 
could “ensure fair and non-discriminatory access to transmission 
services” by forming independent system operators (“ISOs”) to 
manage the transmission grid.42 Subsequently, in Order 2000, 
FERC encouraged utilities to place their transmission facilities un-
der the management of an ISO or Regional Transmission Operator 
(“RTO”).43 
ISO/RTOs are independent bodies which operate the transmis-
sion system in one or more states. Figure 2 below shows the 
ISO/RTOs currently operating in the U.S. Six of those ISO/RTOs—
the California IOS (“CAISO”), Midcontinent ISO (“MISO”), New 
England ISO (“ISO-NE”), NYISO, PJM Interconnection (“PJM”), 
and Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”)—are regulated by FERC.44 
FERC does not have regulatory authority over the Electric Relia-
bility Council of Texas (“ERCOT”), as its transmission system “is 
located solely within the state of Texas and is not synchronously 
interconnected to the rest of the United States.”45 
 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 21,596.  
43. Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,854 
(July 20, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
44.  CAISO, ISO-NE, MISO, NYISO, PJM, and SPP operate interstate transmis-
sion facilities subject to FERC jurisdiction. 16 U.S.C. § 834(b)(1) (providing 
that FERC has jurisdiction over all facilities used in the interstate trans-
mission of electricity). See also Compliance, PJM, https://perma.cc/67VZ-
D4R2; Diligent Oversight Ensures a Competitive Market, CAISO, 
https://perma.cc/3L9K-ZGB6; History: 75 Years of Reliability Through Rela-
tionships, SPP, https://perma.cc/5YCZ-APEF; Industry Standards, Struc-
ture, and Relationships, ISO NEW ENGLAND, https://perma.cc/GX8N-WDK5; 
Leadership and Governance, MISO, https://perma.cc/9EBT-WZKK; Regula-
tory Accountability, NYISO, https://perma.cc/AJY3-5HGP . 
45.  ERCOT, FERC, https://perma.cc/UE82-FFE3 (last updated Nov. 17, 2015). 
ERCOT’s operations are overseen by the Public Utility Commission of Texas 
and the state legislature. See Electric Power Markets: Texas (ERCOT), 
FERC, https://perma.cc/GB6D-6SGV (last updated Mar. 10, 2016).  
13
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Figure 2: ISO/RTOs Operating in the U.S.46 
 
Each ISO/RTO is a non-profit or profit-neutral corporation 
that contracts with transmission facility owners (“Transmission 
Owners”) regarding transmission and wholesale market govern-
ance.47 In addition to those basic contracts, each ISO/RTO also 
adopts two types of tariffs, subject to FERC review (ERCOT’s ex-
cepted), that specify how the ISO/RTO is to oversee regional trans-
mission facilities and markets; the Open Access Transmission Tar-
iff (“OATT”) governs to the former, the RTO tariff, sometimes 
called the Market Services Tariff, the latter.48 
 
46.  Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) / Independent System Opera-
tors (ISO), FERC, https://perma.cc/NBP4-837E (last updated Oct. 19, 2017). 
47.  CAISO, AMENDED AND RESTATED TRANSMISSION CONTROL AGREEMENT 
AMONG THE CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR CORPORATION AND 
TRANSMISSION OWNERS (2017), https://perma.cc/JRQ6-2EJ5; PJM 
INTERCONNECTION, AMENDED AND RESTATED OPERATING AGREEMENT OF PJM 
INTERCONNECTION, LLC (2011), https://perma.cc/KX2K-2T8Y; Transmission 
Operating Agreements, ISO NEW ENGLAND, https://perma.cc/UVB4-HWFL 
(providing links to Transmission Operating Agreement, Rate Design and 
Funds Disbursement Agreement, Phase I/II Transmission Operating Agree-
ment, and Phase I/II HVDC transmission facility). 
48.  FERC, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 53, 57 
(2015), https://perma.cc/KT2H-QQ3Q.  
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B. Wholesale Electricity Market Operation 
Each ISO/RTO operates two wholesale electricity or “energy” 
markets, namely: 
1. a day-ahead market, in which participants commit to buy 
or sell electricity at various times over the next twenty-
four hours, based on forecast demand (“load”); and 
2. a real-time market, in which participants buy and sell elec-
tricity to balance differences between the day ahead com-
mitments and actual load and generation.49 
Wholesale energy markets are open to any entity that, after 
securing the necessary approvals, can generate electricity and de-
liver it to the grid. The principal suppliers in most markets are 
utilities with excess generating capacity, utility-affiliated compet-
itive generators, and independent power producers.50 The princi-
pal buyers in most markets are LSEs, which provide retail electric-
ity services to residential, commercial, and industrial customers. 
LSEs participating in wholesale energy markets currently serve 
consumers accounting for two-thirds of national electricity load.51 
While the specific design of energy markets varies between 
ISO/RTOs, all use bid-based auctions to set prices. During the auc-
tion, generators submit bids indicating the price at which they are 
willing to supply electricity, based on their marginal costs.52 Gen-
erators are dispatched based on their bids, from lowest to highest, 
until load is satisfied.53 The bid of the last supplier dispatched (the 
 
49.  FERC, SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH: DEFINITION, PRACTICES, 
ISSUES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5–6 (2006), https://perma.cc/8HW6-KKHC.  
50. Another category of suppliers is demand-response aggregators—entities 
that enlist end-users to participate in demand-response programs, whereby 
the end-users agree to curtail their electricity use at certain times and sell 
the combined load reduction in wholesale energy markets.  
51.  Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FERC, https://perma.cc/2X7R-
S2RH (last updated Feb. 9, 2016). 
52.  Generators’ bids typically reflect their variable costs of operation, including 
operations and maintenance costs, fuel costs, and emissions costs (e.g., the 
cost of acquiring emissions permits) (if any). SUSAN F. TIERNEY & PAUL J. 
HIBBARD, ANALYSIS GRP., CARBON CONTROL AND COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE 
ELECTRICITY MARKETS: COMPLIANCE PATHS FOR EFFICIENT MARKET 
OUTCOMES 35 (2015), https://perma.cc/F2Q7-WUFK.  
53.  An ISO/RTO may elect not to dispatch generators on the basis of cost if doing 
so would threaten the security of the electricity system. Thus, for example, 
an ISO/RTO may choose not to dispatch the least-cost generator if doing so 
would result in transmission congestion or other operational problems. This 
15
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“marginal generator”) determines the market-clearing price which 
is paid to all suppliers regardless of their bids (see Example 1).54 
 
Several ISO/RTOs also administer auctions for procuring ca-
pacity. In Order 2000, FERC determined that ISO/RTOs should be 
responsible for maintaining electric system reliability,55 which, in 
practice, means ensuring sufficient generating capacity is availa-
ble to satisfy load.56 To that end, ISO/RTOs may operate capacity 
markets in which owners of generating facilities are paid to have 
 
approach is known as “security constrained least-cost” dispatch. For a dis-
cussion of security constrained least cost dispatch, see FERC, supra note 49, 
at 5–9. 
54.  AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND REGIONAL 
TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/V74X-WH99.  
55.  Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,854, 
45,854 (July 20, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
56. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP. (NERC), 2016 LONG-TERM RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT 1 (2016) (explaining that, over the long term, reliability is pri-
marily a function of resource adequacy). 
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reserves57 available in case they are needed in the future.58 Capac-
ity markets operate in a similar way to energy markets, with par-
ticipants submitting bids that reflect the price at which they are 
willing to buy and sell capacity.59 The ISO/RTO then matches the 
bids to determine a clearing price, which is typically expressed per 
unit of capacity and paid to suppliers monthly.60 Whereas capacity 
prices are recovered through fixed monthly payments, electricity 
prices fluctuate hourly. 
If there were no logistical impediments to the flow of electric-
ity, a single price would apply throughout an ISO/RTO region for 
a given interval.61 However, because transmission congestion 
and/or other operational problems regularly impede electricity 
flows, some areas must rely on electricity priced above the region’s 
lowest price.62 To account for differences in the cost of electricity 
used in different areas, ISO/RTOs price electricity using the loca-
tional marginal price (“LMP”) at each of various nodes (i.e., loca-
tions) on the transmission system.63 
 
57.  The term “reserves” refers to generating capacity that is currently unused 
but which is available to serve load. See generally ZHI ZHOU ET AL., CTR. FOR 
ENERGY, ENVTL., AND ECON. SYS. ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF U.S. ANCILLARY 
SERVICES MARKETS (2016), https://perma.cc/HQ8N-4NBM (“[R]eserves are 
typically segmented into two categories, 1) Spinning or Synchronized Re-
serves that are provided by generation units that are actively generating 
and have the ability to increase or decrease their output, 2) Non-spinning or 
Non-synchronized Reserves that are provided by generation resources that 
are not actively generating, but are able to start up and provide generation 
within a specified timeframe. Operating reserves typically have response 
times on the order of ten to 30 minutes and can similarly be provided by 
supply-side resources that are capable of reducing their load.”). 
58. Alternatively, an ISO/RTO may impose “resource adequacy” obligations on 
load-serving entities, requiring them to self-supply capacity, either through 
construction of new capacity resources or by entering into bilateral arrange-
ments to purchase capacity. See TIERNEY & HIBBARD, supra note 52, at 36. 
59. Adam James, Explainer: How Capacity Markets Work, MIDWEST ENERGY 
NEWS (Jun. 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/8VTY-U9X4.  
60. Id. See also What You Need to Know About Capacity Payments, 
ENERGYWATCH, https://perma.cc/KJ8B-V6P5. 
61. PJM INTERCONNECTION, LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING (2016), 
https://perma.cc/T9VQ-KD4K.  
62.  Id. 
63.  For a discussion of locational marginal pricing, see Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, Locational Marginal Pricing, ISO-NE, https://perma.cc/2FCU-ULAT; 
NYISO, “Locational Based Marginal Pricing: The Cornerstone of the NYISO 
Market Operation,” https://perma.cc/FXR3-VJWL; and Buying & Selling 
17
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III. ELECTRICITY MARKETS IN NEW YORK 
Electricity transmission and wholesale electricity sales in New 
York are managed by NYISO. NYISO’s responsibilities include bal-
ancing electricity generation and load in the New York Control 
Area (“NYCA”), which is coterminous with New York’s borders.64 
NYISO divides the NYCA into 11 Zones (see Figure 3 below). Of 
those, the five “downstate” Zones (Long Island, New York City, 
Dunwoodie, Millwood, and the Lower Hudson Valley) account for 
about fifty-eight percent of the state’s load and sixty-five percent 
of its peak load, but generate only forty percent of its electricity.65 
This mismatch has made congestion between downstate and up-
state zones66—and downstate transmission adequacy more gener-
ally—a high-priority issue.67 The addition of over 2,700 MW of 
transmission capacity since 2000 has not resolved the issue, not 
least because peak load continues to grow even as NYISO-wide 
load has flattened out.68 
 
Energy, Locational Marginal Pricing, PJM INTERCONNECTION, 
https://perma.cc/6BED-UX4C.   
64. NYISO, “Power System Fundamentals,” Slide 11 (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/T2JR-RQHJ.  
65.  NYISO, POWER TRENDS 2016: THE CHANGING ENERGY LANDSCAPE 2, 29 
(2016), https://perma.cc/W3QB-9DZH [hereinafter NYISO, POWER TRENDS 
2016]. 
66.  B. Howard et al., Current and Near-Term GHG Emissions Factors from Elec-
tricity Production for New York State and New York City, 187 APPLIED 
ENERGY 255, 258 (2017). 
67.  See DAVID B. PATTON ET AL., POTOMAC ECONOMICS, 2015 STATE OF THE 
MARKET REPORT FOR THE NEW YORK ISO MARKETS 10 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/DRW2-GSFJ (charting levels of inter-zone congestion and 
noting that the value of congestion—meaning costs resulting from it—were 
$539 and $700 for the day-ahead and real-time energy markets respec-
tively). 
68.  NYISO, POWER TRENDS 2016, supra note 65, at 9–10 fig.6. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1
   
2017] Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets 19 


























The generation mix in NYISO has changed substantially over 
the last decade.70 Since 2000, coal and oil have declined, natural 
gas and renewables have made up the difference, and nuclear and 
hydro have held steady (see Figure 4).71 These changes have con-
tributed to substantial reductions in regional emissions: annual 
sulfur dioxide emissions have dropped ninety-seven percent and 
carbon dioxide emissions forty-two percent.72 
 
69. Electric Power Markets: New York (NYISO), FERC, https://perma.cc/WQ7X-
DVR8 (last updated Aug. 3, 2017). 
70.  See NYISO, 2016 LOAD & CAPACITY DATA, GOLD BOOK (2016), 
https://perma.cc/W45L-JLDR.  
71.  NYISO, POWER TRENDS 2016, supra note 65, at 26 fig.20. 
72.  Id. at 36. 
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Figure 4: NYISO Generation Mix 2000 - 201673 
A. NYISO Markets for Energy, Capacity, and 
Ancillary Services 
Like other ISO/RTOs, NYISO manages markets that allocate 
energy, ancillary services, and capacity. The energy and ancillary 
services markets establish prices reflective of the value of energy 
at each locational node on the NYISO transmission network.74 The 
capacity markets establish prices reflective of expectations for how 
much existing and new capacity will be required to meet demand 
generally and at peak times.75 
NYISO’s markets for energy assign location-specific prices in 
five-minute increments based on day-ahead and real-time auc-
tions, as well as bilateral contracts between wholesalers and retail-
ers.76 The day-ahead market schedules about ninety-six percent of 
 
73.  Id. at 26.   
74.  NYISO, NYISO MARKETS: NEW YORK’S MARKETPLACE FOR WHOLESALE 
ELECTRICITY 4, https://perma.cc/48C2-Q7JP [hereinafter NYISO, NYISO 
MARKETS]. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 11. 
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the energy that is delivered in NYISO; the real-time market sched-
ules the remainder and thereby serves as a corrective for day-
ahead arrangements that over- or under-estimate load.77 Auctions 
account for about sixty percent of NYISO’s energy transactions; bi-
lateral contracts account for the remaining forty percent.78 
NYISO’s ancillary services markets assign prices to a group of 
operations that underpin reliability by filling in gaps left by the 
energy markets. NYISO provides some of those operations, some 
are provided by transmission customers and suppliers, and others 
are self-provided by NYISO market participants.79 These opera-
tions, which draw on both physical equipment and human re-
sources, include: 
• voltage support, meaning maintenance of a voltage level 
that falls within both power quality requirements and 
transmission facilities’ heat tolerances;80 
• regulation and frequency response, which involves minute-
to-minute adjustments that balance out unexpected small 
changes in generation and load;81 
• energy imbalance, which is the term of art for allocations 
and settlements arrived at through the real-time market 
that correct for over- or under-estimates by day-ahead 
market participants and managers;82 
• operating reserves, which stand ready to provide backup 
electricity or demand response for ten- and thirty-minute 
intervals in case of a sudden large change in generation or 
load at a given nodal location;83 and 
• black start capability, which is the ability of a generating 
unit to, after shutting down due to a general blackout and 
without assistance from the grid, begin operating and de-
livering power to the grid.84 
Whereas NYISO’s energy and ancillary services markets pro-
vide for electricity services in the short term, its installed capacity 
 
77.  PATTON ET AL., supra note 67, at 36. 
78.  NYISO, NYISO MARKETS, supra note 74, at 4. 
79.  NYISO, ANCILLARY SERVICES MANUAL 1-1 (2016), https://perma.cc/ENW4-
ED26.  
80.  Id. at 3-1. 
81.  Id. at 4-1. 
82.  Id. at 5-1. 
83.  Id. at 6-1 to 6-2. 
84.  Id. at 7-1. 
21
  
22 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35 
market (“ICAP”) trades in options to access transmission, genera-
tion, and demand response resources at some date up to six months 
in the future.85 NYISO’s ICAP operates through a series of auc-
tions.86 In the Capability Period Auction or “strip auction,” which 
occurs twice each year,87 buyers and sellers trade for one or more 
months of capacity. Subsequent Monthly Auctions, held at least 15 
days before the next calendar month (called an “Obligation Pro-
curement Period”), allocate capacity for any gaps left by the Capa-
bility Period Auction.88 Finally, Spot Market Auctions, held at 
least two days before each Obligation Procurement Period, resolve 
any remaining gaps.89 By assigning auction-derived prices to op-
tions to access particular resources, the ICAP signals when addi-
tional resources—whether located within the NYCA or other bal-
ancing areas—are foreseeably necessary to ensure reliability over 
the subsequent months.90 
B. NYISO’s Approach to Planning and Tariff Revision 
Although NYISO’s geographic boundaries align with those of 
New York, NYISO’s physical integration in the Eastern Intercon-
 
85.  NYISO, NYISO MARKETS, supra note 74, at 11; see also EMILIE NELSON, 
NYISO, WRITTEN STATEMENT, DOCKET NO. AD14-18-000, JOINT TECHNICAL 
CONFERENCE ON NEW YORK MARKETS & INFRASTRUCTURE 2–5 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/SH7V-5BEV (summarizing recent history of ICAP). 
86.  NYISO, INSTALLED CAPACITY MANUAL §§ 5-1 to 5-5 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/L9LH-HAGE [hereinafter NYISO, INSTALLED CAPACITY 
MANUAL]. The parameters for “reliability,” which include reserve margins 
and other elements, are specified by the New York State Reliability Council. 
See generally N.Y. STATE RELIABILITY COUNCIL, RELIABILITY RULES & 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL FOR PLANNING AND OPERATING THE NEW YORK STATE 
POWER SYSTEM, VERSION 38 (2016), https://perma.cc/8YVT-5MSG.  
87.  Auctions must be held at least thirty days before each capability period. The 
summer capability period runs from May through October, while the winter 
period runs from November through April. 
88.  NYISO, INSTALLED CAPACITY MANUAL, supra note 86, at 5-3 (2016). 
89.  Id. at 5-4. 
90.  NYISO, INSTALLED CAPACITY MANUAL, supra note 86, at 2-1 to 2-2. The pa-
rameters for “reliability,” which include reserve margins and other ele-
ments, are specified by the New York State Reliability Council. See generally 
N.Y. STATE RELIABILITY COUNCIL, supra note 86.  
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nection means that it trades energy and services in interstate com-
merce, subjecting it to FERC’s authority pursuant to the FPA.91 As 
noted in Part II above, under the FPA, FERC is authorized to reg-
ulate interstate electricity transmission and wholesale sales.92 
FERC’s regulatory authority extends to “any person who owns or 
operates facilities” used in those activities (defined as a “public 
utility”).93 As the operator of New York’s transmission facilities, 
NYISO is a public utility for the purposes of the FPA. 
NYISO codifies nearly all its decision-making protocols in the 
OATT and MST it files with FERC. These tariffs provide compre-
hensive prescriptions for parameters to be achieved, parties to in-
volve, procedures to follow, and valid bases for issuing directions 
and allocating resources.94 This subsection summarizes key fea-
tures of planning and tariff amendment in NYISO, both of which 
give prominent roles to stakeholders.95 
1. Planning 
NYISO’s Comprehensive System Planning Process updates an 
operational model of facilities in NYISO and yields plans for main-
taining reliability over the coming ten-year period.96 It consists of 
the following four subsidiary processes: 
1. Local Transmission Planning Process (“LTPP”); 
 
91.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b). Disputes still sometimes arise over previously unex-
plored instances of jurisdictional line-drawing between NYISO and state en-
tities like the New York PSC. See, e.g., Competitive Transmission Develop-
ers v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 156 FERC ¶ 61,164, 61,718 (Sept. 8, 
2016) (“CTD contends that NYISO improperly surrenders its responsibili-
ties to the New York Commission.”); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 153 
FERC ¶ 61,010, 61,040 (Oct. 2, 2015) (resolving that NYISO rather than the 
PSC had jurisdiction to “establish[] compensation for a generator’s return to 
service to resolve a reliability need”). 
92.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)–(2). 
93.  Id. § 824(e). 
94.  The November 2016 combined version of these tariffs weighed in at almost 
2,800 pages. See NYISO, NYISO TARIFFS (2016), https://perma.cc/4W5K-
WQK2.  
95.  References to “stakeholders” in NYISO tariffs and manuals indicate mer-
chant transmission developers, generation plant owners, generation devel-
opers, demand response providers, and other participants. NYISO, 
RELIABILITY PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL 2-2 (2016), https://perma.cc/8PE7-
LWLG [hereinafter NYISO, RELIABILITY PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL]. 
96.  See NYISO, OATT, ATTACHMENT Y § 3(a) (2008), https://perma.cc/8FPL-
5YT2 (codifying approach to Comprehensive System Planning Process). 
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2. Reliability Planning Process (“RPP”); 
3. Congestion Assessment and Resource Integration Study 
(“CARIS”); and 
4. Public Policy Transmission Planning Process (“PPTPP”).97 
NYISO coordinates the timing of these subsidiary processes so 
that the LTPP is followed by the RPP, which is followed by the 
CARIS; the PPTPP begins midway through LTPP. 
The LTPP gathers NYISO Transmission Owners’ studies of 
their respective areas (“Local Transmission Plans,” or “LTPs”) for 
review by stakeholders and NYISO’s Electric System Planning 
Working Group and Transmission Planning Advisory Subcommit-
tee.98 LTPs can be thought of as schematic maps of existing and 
planned transmission facilities, complete with descriptions of those 
facilities’ operational features.99 
The biennial RPP builds on the LTPs drafted by each of 
NYISO’s eight Transmission Owners.100 The RPP consists of the 
development, review by stakeholders, and approval by NYISO’s 
Board of Directors of two studies. The first, known as the Reliabil-
ity Needs Assessment (“RNA”), memorializes NYISO staff’s assess-
ment of whether existing and planned Bulk Power Transmission 
Facilities are expected to meet Reliability Criteria for resource ad-
equacy, security, and stability over a ten-year time horizon.101 The 
RNA identifies Reliability Needs—i.e., deficiencies vis-à-vis Relia-
bility Criteria that signal where transmission and other projects 
might be necessary—and specifies a Responsible Transmission 
Owner for each need.102 Once NYISO’s Board of Directors approves 
 
97.  NYISO, RELIABILITY PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL, supra note 95, at 1-1.   
98.  See NYISO, MARKETS & OPERATIONS: LOCAL TRANSMISSION OWNER PLANNING 
PROCESS, https://perma.cc/5T6Z-9GUA (“Customers, Market Participants 
and other interested parties may review and comment on the planning cri-
teria and assumptions used by each Transmission Owner, as well as other 
data and models used by each Transmission Owner in its LTPP.”). 
99.  See, e.g., Long Island Power Authority (LIPA), “Local Transmission Owner 
Plan (LTP), Presentation to NYISO Interested Parties” (Oct. 24, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/824X-S67U.  
100. NYISO, 2016 RELIABILITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT (2016), 
https://perma.cc/7JGP-6VUS.  
101. See id. at 26–41. 
102. NYISO, RELIABILITY PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL, supra note 97, at 1-4. 
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the RNA, NYISO requests proposals to address each identified Re-
liability Need103 and, at the same time, seeks a “regulated backstop 
solution” from the Responsible Transmission Owner.104 For the 
purpose of the RPP, a backstop solution serves both as a bench-
mark against which to assess market-based solutions’ viability 
and—of course—as a backstop in case no satisfactory market-
based solution materializes. 
The second report prepared as part of the RPP, known as the 
Comprehensive Reliability Plan (“CRP”), lists all viable solutions 
proposed to address Reliability Needs and contains NYISO’s eval-
uation of those solutions.105 NYISO selects from among viable so-
lutions based on their relative cost-effectiveness. 
Completion of the CRP prompts the start of the third subsidi-
ary planning process: CARIS. Like the RPP, CARIS identifies pos-
sible needs, seeks proposed solutions, and then evaluates and se-
lects from among those solutions.106 The chief difference is that 
congestion, unlike Reliability Needs, is chiefly an issue of cost-ef-
fectiveness rather than system stability, security, or reliability. 
Thus, both the identification and evaluation phases of CARIS in-
volve cost-benefit analyses that can result in a decision to simply 
tolerate—rather than address—a given instance of congestion.107 
The PPTPP addresses “public policy requirements,” which 
NYISO defines as a: 
federal or New York State statute or regulation, including a New 
York Public Service Commission (“NYPSC”) order adopting a rule 
or regulation . . . , or any duly enacted law or regulation passed by 
a local governmental entity in New York State, that may relate to 
 
103. Id. Proposals can include all resource types: transmission, generation, de-
mand response, or non-transmission alternatives. 
104. Id. Whereas market-based solutions receive compensation through NYISO-
administered markets or bilateral agreements, backstop solutions receive 
compensation directly from NYISO pursuant to provisions of NYISO’s tariff. 
105. Id. at 1-5. 
106. NYISO, ECONOMIC PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL – CONGESTION ASSESSMENT 
AND RESOURCE INTEGRATION STUDIES 1-4 to 1-5 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/Z3QC-2C6L.  
107. This is why NYISO categorizes the CARIS as part of its economic planning 
process rather than the RPP or public-policy-oriented process. See NYISO, 
PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION PLANNING MANUAL 1-2 to 1-3 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/ACT6-VVP3 [hereinafter NYISO, PUBLIC POLICY 
TRANSMISSION PLANNING MANUAL]. 
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transmission planning on the [Bulk Power Transmission Facili-
ties].108 
The PPTPP was developed to identify transmission needs 
rooted in public policy in compliance with FERC’s Order 1000, and 
it looks to the NYPSC to help identify and specify public policy re-
quirements.109 The subjects of public policy requirements in New 
York include reducing congestion (on its own or as a means of re-
ducing electricity rates) and reducing the carbon intensity of gen-
eration in the NYCA, among others.110 
NYISO initiates the PPTPP upon the release of a draft version 
of the RNA, at which point the PPTPP follows the same basic steps 
as the RPP and CARIS: identify needs, seek viable solutions, eval-
uate solutions (in the PPTPP context, make a Viability and Suffi-
ciency Assessment), and select from among solutions based on ef-
ficiency and cost-effectiveness.111 A recent example of the PPTPP 
at work relates to plans to “unbottle” the transmission linkage con-
necting western New York to the hydroelectric generation and 
pumped storage facilities located near Niagara Falls.112 The 
NYPSC designated unbottling as a Public Policy Transmission 
Need after concluding that it would result in “significant environ-
mental, economic, and reliability benefits.”113 Whatever project or 
projects address a transmission need will qualify as a Public Policy 
Transmission Project, eligible to recover costs under NYISO’s 
 
108. NYISO, OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF, ATTACHMENT Y § 31.1.1 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/3QHZ-FNU6.  
109. Order Addressing Public Policy Transmission Need for Western New York, 
Case No. 14-E-0454 at 2–3 (N.Y. Pub .Serv. Comm’n Oct. 13, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/3WK5-NP97 [hereinafter Case No. 14-E-0454] (describing 
origin and purpose of PPTPP). 
110. Order Finding Transmission Needs Driven by Public Policy Requirements, 
Case No. 12-T-0502 et al. at 8–12 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/5RZU-4565 [hereinafter Case No. 12-T-0502]. 
111. NYISO, PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION PLANNING MANUAL, supra note 107, at 
1-3.  
112. Case No. 14-E-0454, supra note 109, at 5–7 (describing need); NYISO, 
WESTERN NEW YORK PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION NEED PROJECT 
SOLICITATION (2016), https://perma.cc/ULS5-HCTJ (requesting Solicitations 
to address need). 
113. Oct. 13, 2016 Order, Case 14-E-0454, supra note 109, at 4–5. 
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OATT.114 In its comments in an ongoing NYPSC proceeding deal-
ing with transmission needs, NYISO observed that “[a]ll of the 
Submittals point to the [New York Clean Energy Standard], which 
requires 50 percent of the state’s electric energy to come from re-
newable resources by 2030 (‘50% by 30’), as a primary driver of the 
need for new transmission facilities in New York.”115 Thus, it ap-
pears that many, if not all, transmission proposals currently before 
NYISO could qualify as a Public Policy Transmission Project. 
2. Tariff Revisions and Stakeholder Involvement 
NYISO uses a multi-committee review process to make deci-
sions, including about whether to propose a tariff revision for 
FERC’s approval. NYISO’s basic contract provides for three com-
mittees: Management, Operations, and Business Issues.116 Each is 
further governed by By-Laws.117 Formally, NYISO may propose re-
visions to its MST or OATT to FERC if majorities of the ten-mem-
ber NYISO Board of Directors and the Management Committee 
concur.118 But this formal step is just the last in a more elaborate 
process, sometimes called the “shared governance process” or 
“stakeholder review process.”119 Figure 5 depicts the structure of 
committees and subsidiary subcommittees and working groups 
whose members review, mark up, and revise proposals before the 
Management, Operations, or Business Issues Committee finalizes 
 
114. NYISO, PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION PLANNING MANUAL, supra note 107, at 
3-3. 
115. In the Matter of New York Independent System Operator, Inc.’s Proposed 
Public Policy Transmission Needs for Consideration for 2016, Case No. 16-
E-0558 at 7 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/GA4F-
XZEF.  
116. NYISO, NYISO AGREEMENTS art. 7–9 (2013), https://perma.cc/4NN2-6MAM.  
117. NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE BUSINESS ISSUES COMMITTEE (2015), 
https://perma.cc/CP59-5Y9Z; NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE MANAGEMENT 
COMMITTEE (2015), https://perma.cc/5CNB-NXWS [hereinafter NYISO, BY-
LAWS OF THE BUSINESS ISSUES COMMITTEE]; NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE 
OPERATING COMMITTEE (2015), https://perma.cc/59CZ-H9J6 [hereinafter 
NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE OPERATING COMMITTEE]. 
118. NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE NYISO, INC. art. II § 6(b) (2016), 
https://perma.cc/WFR8-U7WL; NYISO, NYISO AGREEMENTS art. 19 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/4NN2-6MAM [hereinafter NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE NYISO, 
INC.].  
119. See generally NYISO, NYISO SHARED GOVERNANCE (2017), 
https://perma.cc/Z4LM-3ZVH.   
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them for consideration by the Board.120 
Figure 5: NYISO Committee Structure 
 
Percolation up through this committee structure ensures that 
committee members receive notice and an opportunity to be heard 
on matters relevant to their client or constituents. NYISO’s basic 
contract allocates votes on the Management Committee among 
generators, other suppliers, transmission owners, end-use consum-
ers, and public power and environmental groups;121 the other com-
mittees follow the same rubric.122 
 
120. For a short description of what each component contributes to the whole, see 
NYISO, COMMITTEE STRUCTURE: SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES 2–5 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/WE8Q-DUZY.  
121. NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE NYISO, INC., supra note 118, at art. 7, § 7.06. 
122. NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE BUSINESS ISSUES COMMITTEE, supra note 117, at 
§ 12.01; NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE OPERATING COMMITTEE, supra note 117, at 
§ 12.01. 
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C. FERC Oversight of NYISO 
The FPA requires public utilities to notify FERC before mak-
ing changes to rates or “rules and regulations affecting or pertain-
ing to” rates.123 Such notice must be given by filing, with FERC, 
new rate schedules showing the change(s) to be made to the sched-
ules in force.124 The new schedules will take effect after sixty days 
unless FERC, on its own initiative or following a complaint, com-
mences a review thereof.125 Where a review is undertaken, FERC 
may suspend operation of the schedules for up to five months while 
it assesses their lawfulness.126 Based on that assessment, FERC 
may accept or reject the schedule, in whole or in part.127 
FERC’s review is intended to ensure that the rates and prac-
tices set out in the schedule are just and reasonable128 and not un-
duly preferential or discriminatory.129 These terms are not defined 
in the FPA or other legislation. Guidance on their meaning has, 
however, been provided in numerous administrative and court de-
cisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that the just 
and reasonable standard is “incapable of precise judicial defini-
tion.”130 FERC is, therefore, “afford[ed] great deference . . . in its 
 
123. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a), (d) (stating that “no change shall be made by any public 
utility in any . . . rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regu-
lation, or contract relating thereto, except after sixty days’ notice to the Com-
mission”). 
124. Id. § 824d(a). FERC may allow changes to take effect without requiring sixty 
days’ notice.  
125. Id. § 824d(e). 
126. Id. The schedules will go into effect after five months, regardless of whether 
FERC has completed its review. 
127. Id. (indicating that, after completing its assessment, FERC “may make such 
orders with reference [to the rates] as would be proper in a proceeding initi-
ated after it had become effective”). See also id. § 824e (authorizing FERC 
to determine just and reasonable rates). 
128. Id. § 824d(a) (requiring that “all rates . . . made, demanded, or received by 
any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of elec-
tricity energy . . . and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to 
such rates . . . be just and reasonable”). 
129. Id. § 824d(b) (providing that public utilities must not “(1) make or grant any 
undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any 
undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable differ-
ence in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect”). 
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rate decisions.”131 FERC is not required to set rates at any partic-
ular level132 or use any particular methodology.133 The only re-
quirement is that the methodology used appropriately balance the 
interests of suppliers and customers,134 such that rates fall “within 
a ‘zone of reasonableness,’ where [they] are neither ‘less than com-
pensatory’ nor ‘excessive.’”135 Rates must be high enough to enable 
suppliers to recover their costs and earn a return on investment,136 
but not so high as to result in customer exploitation, abuse, or 
gouging or unjust discrimination between customer groups.137 
The same just and reasonable standard applies to both cost- 
and market-based rates. With respect to the latter, FERC has 
taken the view that rates set in competitive markets will fall 
within the “zone of reasonableness,” provided that no participant 
can exercise market power.138 This approach has been upheld by 
the courts. In Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit ob-
served that, “[i]n a competitive market, where neither buyer nor 
seller has significant market power, it is rational to assume that 
the terms of their voluntary exchange are reasonable.”139 In this 
context, market power has been defined as the ability of a seller to 
“significantly influence price in the market by withholding service 
and excluding competitors for a significant period of time.”140 Prior 
to approving a market-based tariff, FERC requires the seller to 
demonstrate that it lacks or has adequately mitigated market 
power and is unable to erect barriers to entry.141 FERC monitors 
sellers’ activities in the market to ensure that they do not re-attain 
 
131. Id. 
132. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968). 
133. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). 
134. Id.  
135. Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
136. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 603. 
137. Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 734 F.2d at 1502. 
138. Order No. 697, Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, 
Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,903, 
39,906 (July 20, 2017) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
139. Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
140. This definition was adopted in FERC’s first market-based rate authoriza-
tion. See Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 FERC ¶ 61,210, 61,777 (Aug. 8, 
1989). 
141. Order No. 697, 72 Fed. Reg. at 39,908. 
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market power.142 
FERC has also taken steps to enhance the functioning of mar-
kets and improve their competitiveness. For example, beginning in 
2008, FERC adopted several orders aimed at removing barriers to 
the participation of demand-side resources in markets.143 More re-
cently, in 2014, FERC initiated a broad-ranging review of market 
design and operational practices that may impair competition.144 
Based on that review’s findings, FERC has required various design 
changes aimed at improving how markets run.145 Thus, as the Su-
preme Court has observed, FERC “ensure[s] ‘just and reasonable’ 
wholesale [electricity] rates by enhancing competition—attempt-
ing . . . to break down regulatory and economic barriers that hinder 
a free market in wholesale.”146 
IV. PRICING CARBON IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
There is growing interest among ISO/RTOs in incorporating 
carbon pricing into wholesale energy and/or capacity markets. In 
August 2016, NYISO launched the Integrating Public Policy Pro-
ject (“IPPP”) to assess whether introduction of a carbon price 
“would improve the overall efficiency of . . . energy and capacity 
markets,” among other things.147 Proposals for how to better re-
spond to state and federal policies aimed at reducing carbon diox-
ide emissions from electricity generation have also been considered 
by CAISO, ISO-NE, and PJM. 
 
142. Id. 
143. Order No. 745, Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale 
Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,657 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 745]; Order No. 719, Wholesale Competition 
in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,775 (July 29, 
2009) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
144. FERC, Notice: Price Formation in Energy and Ancillary Services Markets 
Docket Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent 
System Operators, Docket No. AD14-14-000 (June 19, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/W2ZL-BZEB.  
145. See, e.g., Order No. 825, Settlement Intervals and Shortage Pricing in Mar-
kets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent 
System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,881 (June 30, 2016) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 825]. 
146. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (quoting Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. 
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 536 (2008)). 
147. Mike DeSocio, “NYISO, 2017 Integrating Public Policy: Detailed Scope,” 
Slide 3 (2016), https://perma.cc/MQ3P-LYTD.   
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A. Electricity Generation and Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions 
Electricity generation is a leading source of carbon dioxide 
emissions in the U.S. According to the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”), electricity generation emitted over two billion 
metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2014, equivalent to 36.7 percent of 
national carbon dioxide emissions.148 The level of emissions from a 
particular generating unit varies depending on the fuel used and 
its carbon intensity.149 Coal is the most carbon-intensive generat-
ing fuel, followed by oil (which contains twenty-five percent less 
carbon than coal per unit of energy) and gas (which contains forty-
five percent less carbon than coal).150 Other generating fuels, such 
as nuclear and renewables, contain little or no carbon. 
When coal and other fossil fuels are combusted during electric-
ity generation, the carbon stored in the fuel is oxidized, producing 
carbon dioxide and small amounts of other gases.151 The Energy 
Information Administration (“EIA”) estimates that coal-fired gen-
erating units emit, on average, 2.1 pounds of carbon dioxide per 
kilowatt hour (“KWh”) of electricity generated.152 Carbon dioxide 
emissions from oil- and gas-fired units average 1.7153 and 1.2154 
pounds per KWh of electricity generated respectively. 
Carbon dioxide traps heat in the earth’s atmosphere, causing 
surface temperatures to rise. According to the 2014 National Cli-
mate Assessment, average annual temperatures in the U.S. have 
risen by 1 to 2oF since 1895, and may rise a further 2 to 4oF “over 
 
148. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990 – 2014 
ES-5, tbl.ES-2 (2016), https://perma.cc/T3LT-5AMU.  
149. Id. at 3-6, tbl.3-6. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 3-8.   
152. Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Carbon Dioxide is Produced per Kil-
owatt Hour when Generating Electricity with Fossil Fuels?, ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (“EIA”) (Feb. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/VHF4-8EDV (estimating 
emissions from generating units using bituminous coal, subbituminous coal, 
and lignite coal at 2.07, 2.16, and 2.17 pounds per kilowatt hour (“KWh”) 
respectively).  
153. Id. (estimating emissions from generating units using distillate oil (no. 2) 
and residual oil (no. 6) at 1.64 and 1.76 pounds per KWh respectively). 
154. Id. (estimating emissions from generating units using natural gas at 1.22 
pounds per KWh).  
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the next few decades.”155 Temperatures have risen far faster in 
Alaska—since 1949, average annual temperatures have risen by 
3.73oF and average winter temperatures by 6.71oF.156 Rising tem-
peratures lead to more variable precipitation patterns and increase 
the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. Impacts ex-
pected in the New York region include more frequent and intense 
heat waves, more intense precipitation events, storm surges inci-
dent to sea level rise, and more powerful coastal storms.157 These 
impacts are already being felt in many areas and “have affected 
and will continue to affect human health, water supply, agricul-
ture, transportation, energy . . . and many other sectors of society” 
over coming decades.158 
B. Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Electricity Generation 
Recognizing that climate change endangers public health and 
welfare, in December 2009, the EPA listed carbon dioxide as an air 
pollutant under the Clean Air Act.159 EPA regulations, adopted in 
August 2015 and known as the Clean Power Plan, aim to reduce 
emissions from existing electric generating units by thirty-two per-
cent below 2005 levels by 2025.160 The regulations establish emis-
sions limits for each state’s electricity sector but do not specify how 
those limits are to be achieved.161 This is left to the discretion of 
 
155. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 8 (Jerry M. Me-
lillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014), 
https://perma.cc/6S2L-66DV.  
156. Temperature Changes in Alaska, UNIV. OF ALASKA-FAIRBANKS: ALASKA 
CLIMATE RESEARCH CTR., https://perma.cc/M6T7-XND2.  
157. New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report Executive Summary, 
1336 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 9, 9–11 (2015), https://perma.cc/3LCU-58YM.  
158. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 155, at 9. 
159. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 
2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1).  
160. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court stayed imple-
mentation of the regulations, pending judicial review. See West Virginia v. 
EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).  
161. See Clean Power Plan State-Specific Fact Sheets, EPA, 
https://perma.cc/8872-AXVM (last updated Sept. 16, 2016). 
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the states, which have wide latitude in deciding how to comply. A 
number of states were considering carbon pricing as a means of 
complying with the Clean Power Plan.162 Notably, however, many 
states suspended their compliance work following the February 
2016 Supreme Court decision to stay implementation of the Clean 
Power Plan pending resolution of legal challenges thereto.163 Even if 
the Clean Power Plan is upheld by the courts, and not successfully repealed by the 
Trump Administration’s EPA,164 it is unlikely to be implemented for the dura-
tion of the Trump Administration, having been strongly opposed 
by President Trump during his campaign.165 
C. Why Put a Price on Carbon Dioxide Emissions? 
The costs associated with carbon dioxide emissions are gener-
ally not reflected in electricity market prices.166 Those costs take 
the form of “externalities”—impacts felt by third parties or the 
public at large—but have no price attributed to them by market 
participants.167 This results in a market failure, whereby prices 
are lower than costs, leading to higher levels of production and con-
sumption than are socially optimal.168 Government intervention is 
therefore needed to ensure that social costs are fully considered in 
production and consumption decisions.169 Such intervention could 
 
162. See, e.g., MELINDA E. TAYLOR & ROMANY M. WEBB, UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW, 
EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN: IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS 15 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/99DR-CM5L.  
163. E&E’s Power Plan Hub: Supreme Court Stay Response, E&E NEWS (2016), 
https://perma.cc/3RW5-VDGX.  
164. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (proposed 
Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
165. Annie Sneed, Trump’s First 100 Days: Climate and Energy, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (Nov. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/RKF8-D7U7.  
166. For a discussion of this issue, see NOAH KAUFMAN ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES 
INST., PUTTING A PRICE ON CARBON: REDUCING EMISSIONS 6 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/4NFQ-K3AD.  
167. Id.  
168. Id. 
169. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE 3 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/2AHP-VD5W (stating that, when prices do not reflect ex-
ternal costs, they “are ‘hidden’ in the sense that government and other deci-
sion makers, such as electric utility managers, may not recognize the full 
costs of their actions. When market failures like this occur, there may be a 
case for government interventions in the form of regulations, taxes, fees, 
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take a number of forms, including command-and-control regula-
tions that limit the use of fossil fuels in electricity generation, or 
market-based instruments, such as carbon pricing. 
A carbon price internalizes the external costs of carbon dioxide 
emissions from electricity generation and thus increases the cost 
of generation using fossil fuels, leading to lower demand from con-
sumers and encouraging generators to switch to cleaner alterna-
tives. Generators will make the switch and/or take other steps to 
reduce emissions wherever the costs of doing so are less than the 
carbon price. In this way, carbon pricing affords generators flexi-
bility to find and exploit the most cost-effective emissions reduc-
tions. It tends to be more efficient than command-and-control reg-
ulation, which may force generators to pursue higher-cost 
emissions reductions. 
Despite these benefits, to date, Congress has failed to enact 
legislation establishing a national carbon pricing scheme. In the 
absence of federal action, some states have adopted their own, 
more limited pricing schemes. One example is California, which 
has established a cap-and-trade program requiring in-state elec-
tricity generators and importers170 emitting 25,000 metric tons or 
more of carbon dioxide equivalent per year to purchase allowances, 
at prices set through quarterly auctions.171 Another even more lim-
ited example is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), 
in which New York and eight other northeastern states partici-
pate.172 As part of RGGI, fossil fuel generators with at least 
twenty-five megawatts (“MW”) of capacity in New York and other 
participating states are required to purchase carbon dioxide emis-
sions allowances through quarterly auctions.173 RGGI thus assigns 
a price to approximately eight percent of state-wide emissions from 
all sectors; it ignores emissions from smaller electricity generators 
 
tradable permits, or other instruments that will motivate such recogni-
tion.”). 
170. An electricity importer’s emissions are calculated based on the annual emis-
sions from each of its sources. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95812(c)(2)(B) 
(2014). 
171. Id. § 95852(b).  
172. RGGI, Inc., RGGI, https://perma.cc/H3H4-MD2N.   
173. Regulated Sources, RGGI, https://perma.cc/9TGG-9R2D [hereinafter RGGI, 
Regulated Sources]. For a list of covered facilities in New York, see New 
York: Facility Information, RGGI, https://perma.cc/BQ7F-KL4S [hereinafter 
RGGI, New York: Facility Information].  
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and electricity imports, as well as direct emissions from the indus-
trial, transportation, or agricultural sectors.174 
D. Proposals for Carbon Pricing in ISO/RTOs 
Several ISO/RTOs have recently explored mechanisms that 
would support the direct or indirect pricing of generation sources’ 
carbon intensity. The mechanisms and the reasons why they are 
being considered are summarized in this part. One notable impe-
tus for this exploration in NYISO, PJM, CAISO, and ISO-NE was 
EPA’s adoption of the Clean Power Plan, which aimed at reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil fuel power plants. 
The Trump Administration’s proposal to withdraw the Clean 
Power Plan has raised questions about the direction each ISO/RTO 
will take. While rescission of the Clean Power Plan would remove 
a key driver for action nationwide and in New York, it would not, 
from a legal perspective, directly affect ISO/RTOs’ authority to 
adopt a carbon pricing scheme, which does not rely on EPA regu-
lations. (This might change, should the Trump Administration and 
Congress undo EPA’s 2009 Endangerment Finding and the various 
regulatory authorities built upon it.175) For many ISO/RTOs, in-
cluding NYISO, state-level policies (e.g., New York’s CES) will con-
tinue to drive interest in carbon pricing. 
1. New York ISO 
NYISO’s IPPP will assess “[w]hether a redesign is needed in 
the wholesale market” and, in particular, whether and how to “in-
ternalize the cost of carbon” to improve market efficiency.176 The 
IPPP was launched to “investigate potential market impacts from 
 
174. LUCAS BIFERA, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, REGIONAL 
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 2 fig.1 (2013), https://perma.cc/9HCE-K6QB; 
see also NYSERDA, NEW YORK STATE GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY AND 
FORECAST: INVENTORY 1990-2011 AND FORECAST 2012-2030, UPDATED FINAL 
REPORT S-2 (2015), https://perma.cc/Q76D-AQW8.  
175. See Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC 
Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 305 (2014) 
(“In today’s dominant regulatory and policy paradigm, the environmental 
consequences of electricity generation are ‘matters directly related to the 
economic aspects’ of such transactions.”) (emphasis added). 
176. DeSocio, supra note 147, at Slides 3, 5. 
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the implementation of the [CES]”177 adopted by the NYPSC in Au-
gust 2016.178 As part of the IPPP, NYISO will consider “[a]lterna-
tive market friendly approaches” to achieving the goals of the CES, 
including carbon pricing.179 
2. PJM Interconnection 
An August 2016 PJM white paper put forward a mechanism 
for reconciling two competing priorities in the PJM region: 
1. states’ subsidies and price supports for renewable genera-
tion, which depress energy market prices; and 
2. timely investments in new generation capacity, which rely 
on signals sent by market price rises.180 
That mechanism would involve a two-stage auction. In Stage 1, 
subsidized resources and the demand they would serve (“related 
demand”) would both be removed from the auction for the purpose 
of determining capacity requirements for the relevant time pe-
riod.181 The resources that clear the auction and the subsidized re-
sources would both take on capacity commitments, all with identi-
cal performance requirements.182 Compensation for the subsidized 
resources’ capacity commitments would be entirely the responsi-
bility of their sponsoring state government; the related demand 
would not have to pay.183 In Stage 2, subsidized resources would 
be included in the auction, but at a reference price that approxi-
mates the unsubsidized cost for that resource type at the relevant 
locational node.184 Any resource that fails to clear in Stage 1 would 
not be eligible to receive compensation through the auction, even if 
it bids into Stage 2 at a price below the second stage clearing 
price.185 
 
177. Id. at Slide 2. 
178. Press Release, Governor of New York’s Press Office, Governor Cuomo An-
nounces Establishment of Clean Energy Standard that Mandates 50 Percent 
Renewables by 2030 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/8TLM-LQ64.   
179. DeSocio, supra note 147, at Slide 5.  
180. STU BRESLER, PJM INTERCONNECTION, POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO 
EXPANDING THE MINIMUM OFFER PRICE RULE TO EXISTING RESOURCES 1 
(2016), https://perma.cc/M7YG-7BWW.  
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This two-stage process would not assign a price to carbon, but 
would make it easier for states located in the PJM balancing area 
to do so without disrupting the operation of the wholesale energy 
or capacity markets. 
3. California ISO 
California’s legislature and governor have called for expansion 
of CAISO to encompass other western states on the grounds that 
such expansion will serve several goals, including lowering costs, 
improving reliability, and supporting renewable energy develop-
ment.186 That expansion would, however, mean departing from a 
situation where the California Public Utility Commission and 
CAISO largely share a geographic footprint that does not extend 
beyond California’s borders. The new, expanded CAISO would 
have to devise and manage a wholesale marketplace that spans 
multiple states, only one of which assigns a price to GHG emis-
sions. CAISO devised three possible mechanisms (“Options”) for 
navigating this circumstance: 
Compare the actual dispatch of electricity from particular 
sources that serve load in California to weeks- or months-long 
baselines, and thereby attribute estimated GHG emissions to par-
ticular sources based on the differences between actual and base-
line dispatch; 
1. Conduct quick (at five-minute intervals) two-step analyses 
that first determine the most cost-effective regional dis-
patch of electricity and then attribute GHG emissions to 
sources; or 
2. Conduct a two-step analysis similar to Option 2, but rather 
than mapping dispatch and attributing emissions with 
 
186. California Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of 2015, c. 547 § 13 
(2015) (amending Pub. Util. Code § 359.5 (a) to read: “It is the intent of the 
Legislature to provide for the transformation of the Independent System 
Operator into a regional organization . . . , and that the transformation 
should only occur where it is in the best interests of California and its rate-
payers.”); Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of Cal., to Cal. State 
Legislature (Aug. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/68RM-KPDV; see also THE 
BRATTLE GROUP ET AL., SENATE BILL 350 STUDY: THE IMPACTS OF A REGIONAL 
ISO-OPERATED POWER MARKET ON CALIFORNIA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I-xiv 
(2016), https://perma.cc/TVD8-8NVT (noting that demand for integration of 
more renewables prompts need to expand). 
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complete specificity (a computationally difficult task), im-
pose either an averaged emissions factor or a residual 
emissions rate (sometimes called a “hurdle rate”) on im-
ported generation, making exceptions for generators party 
to bilateral contracts with California LSEs.187 
Of these, CAISO and the California Air Resources Board 
(“CARB”) are now considering only Option 3.188 CAISO and CARB 
raised concerns about Option 1 because CARB’s regulations would 
not permit the crediting of emissions reductions involved.189 And 
CAISO indicated that performing the quick calculations required 
for Option 2 would exceed its computational capacity.190 
4. ISO New England 
The New England Power Pool (“NEPOOL”) initiated the Inte-
grating Markets and Public Policy (“IMAPP”) stakeholder process 
in August 2016 to explore options for decarbonizing the electric 
grid without sacrificing reliability or market-based electricity price 
formation.191 In addition to anticipating Clean Power Plan compli-
ance measures, two other factors motivated IMAPP: first, natural 
gas has dominated regional capacity additions to such an extent 
since the late 1990s that ISO-NE is now susceptible to significant 
adverse effects should there be a natural gas supply shock or price 
 
187. G. ANGELIDIS & D. TRETHEWAY, CAL. ISO, REGIONAL INTEGRATION CALIFORNIA 
GREENHOUSE GAS COMPLIANCE AND EIM GREENHOUSE GAS ENHANCEMENT 
STRAW PROPOSAL 9–10 (2016), https://perma.cc/8EE6-8MEU; see also North-
ern California Power Agency, Comments on Regional GHG Compliance Oc-
tober 13 Technical Workshop 2–3 (Oct. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/2YCH-
MNJD (describing rate applied to out-of-state entities as a “hurdle rate”). 
188. Don Tretheway, “Regional Integration-California Greenhouse Gas Compli-
ance Initiative–Second Update,” Slide 42 (Oct. 13, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/4X4F-2YU2.  
189. Id. at Slide 16. 
190. Id. at Slide 18 (“[c]urrent computational power would require simplifying 
(less accurate) first pass to ensure [real-time dispatch] successfully com-
pletes”). 
191. NEW ENGLAND POWER POOL (“NEPOOL”), CHAIRMAN’S OPENING REMARKS, 
NEPOOL IMAPP INITIATIVE 2 (2016), https://perma.cc/3PU4-8X5T (“Our 
goal is to achieve and maintain our high standards for reliability that our 
constituents demand, and to do so using the discipline of competition, while 
incorporating the states’ goals of decarbonizing our industry over time.”) (em-
phasis added). IMAPP agendas, presentations, and white papers are all 
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jump;192 and second, wholesale market prices are artificially re-
duced by the inclusion of subsidized resources in capacity auctions, 
which in turn distorts incentives for investment in new capacity.193 
(All six states within ISO-NE’s territory provide for some form of 
support for renewables.194) 
Participants put forward fifteen different proposals, which fall 
into four broad categories as follows: 
1. introduction of a carbon pricing scheme, whereby a carbon 
adder would be imposed on generators’ bids, reflecting 
their carbon intensity; 
2. changes to the forward capacity market such that certain 
generators would receive payments for both their capacity 
and their zero emission attributes; 
3. introduction of a two-stage auction, similar to that pro-
posed by PJM, which insulates wholesale market price for-
mation from state policies; and 
4. establishment of a Forward Clean Energy Market, in 
which LSEs could procure long-term commitments (up to 
ten years) for zero-emitting energy (not capacity) re-
sources. 
V. NEW YORK’S EXISTING CARBON PRICING 
POLICIES 
New York has introduced not one but two partial carbon 
prices, first by participating in RGGI, a cap-and-trade scheme, and 
more recently with the NYPSC’s adoption of the CES. Both pro-
grams focus on the electricity sector but take different approaches 
to price formation and leakage, i.e., out-of-state emissions that are 
(i) not subject to restrictions or pricing and (ii) caused by in-state 
 
192. ISO NEW ENGLAND, 2016 REGIONAL ELECTRICITY OUTLOOK 14 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/K2TM-VS5A.  
193. ISO NEW ENGLAND, THE IMPORTANCE OF PERFORMANCE-BASED CAPACITY 
MARKET TO ENSURE RELIABILITY AS THE GRID ADAPTS TO A RENEWABLE 
ENERGY FUTURE 5 (2015), https://perma.cc/Z5PQ-KJE7.   
194. Gordon van Welie, ISO New England, “State of the Grid: ISO on Back-
ground,” Slide 30 (Jan. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/E4SQ-SPH5 (noting that 
all six states impose RPSs); see also, e.g., Mass. H.B. 4568 (2016) (authoriz-
ing state agency to draft and execute PPAs for renewable generation); Conn. 
Pub. Act No. 15-107 (same). 
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electricity consumption.195 As described in this part, their ap-
proaches to prices and leakage have important legal implications. 
A. RGGI 
RGGI, the older of New York’s two carbon pricing programs, 
requires New York’s seventy-six largest in-state fossil-fuel-fired 
generators to purchase carbon dioxide emissions allowances.196 
The legal basis for New York’s participation in RGGI is a set of 
regulations adopted by the state Department of Environmental 
Conservation (“DEC”) and Energy Research and Development Au-
thority (“NYSERDA”).197 State regulations require covered gener-
ators to purchase carbon dioxide emissions allowances through 
quarterly auctions.198 Auctions are conducted using a sealed bid 
 
195. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41836, THE REGIONAL 
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 14 
(2016), https://perma.cc/ML6H-CFZL. A more general definition of leakage 
is: an “increase in emissions by entities not subject to a regulation, due to 
increases in costs for generators subject to the regulation.” Daniel Shawhan, 
“Emission Reductions and ‘Leakage’ from US State Cap-and-Trade Pro-
grams,” Slide 5 (Sept. 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/PEJ7-F9FL.  
196. Generators with a capacity of 25MW or more are required to purchase al-
lowances through RGGI. See RGGI, Regulated Sources, supra note 173. For 
a list of covered facilities in New York, see RGGI, New York: Facility Infor-
mation, supra note 173. 
197. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 242 (2017) (DEC: CO2 Budget Trading 
Program; requiring covered facilities to purchase allowances); N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 507 (2017) (NYSERDA: CO2 Allowance Auction 
Program; authorizing NYSERDA to coordinate New York facilities’ partici-
pation in auctions). Governor Pataki, along with the governors of other 
RGGI states, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005. RGGI, 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2005), https://perma.cc/G6YQ-443U. 
That document has no legal force and merely memorialized the governors’ 
commitments to pursue whatever was necessary for their respective states 
to participate. See Thrun v. Cuomo, 976 N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (App. Div. 3d 
Dep’t 2013). The only legal challenge brought against New York’s participa-
tion in RGGI argued that (i) because it is effectively a tax, legislative ap-
proval is required; (ii) the Memorandum of Understanding is an unconstitu-
tional interstate compact; and (3) the regulations themselves were arbitrary 
and capricious and promulgated pursuant to an “error of law.” Id. at 323. 
The court rejected all these arguments, which were raised well after the 
four-month statute of limitations had run. Id. at 324. 
198. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 242-1.4, 242-1.5(c). 
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format in which each generator may submit multiple bids to pur-
chase a specified number of allowances at different prices.199 Bids 
are ranked by price, from high to low, and allowances issued until 
cumulative demand equals supply.200 A region-wide declining cap 
limits the number of allowances available for purchase.201 The cap 
was set at 86.5 million allowances in 2016202 and will decline to 76 
million allowances by 2020.203 Each allowance permits the holder 
to emit one ton of carbon dioxide. 
Because RGGI states impose a price on carbon dioxide emis-
sions, in the form of an allowance cost, and the states around them 
do not, the program is vulnerable to leakage. Like other RGGI 
states, New York’s RGGI-implementing regulations do not cur-
rently seek to prevent leakage. Recent analyses of whether this 
leakage tolerance has undermined RGGI’s carbon price conclude 
that, to date, RGGI’s emissions pricing has increased imports,204 
but that access to imports from relatively cheap natural gas-fired 
generation in Pennsylvania and Ohio and hydropower in Québec 
have meant a decrease in emissions nonetheless.205 Regardless of 
 
199. RGGI, FACT SHEET: RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS (2017), 
https://perma.cc/AKD6-V6B8.  
200. RGGI, CO2 ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 10 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/MP8D-R33N.  
201. See generally RAMSEUR, supra note 195.  
202. 2016 Allowance Allocation, RGGI (2016), https://perma.cc/6HM3-ZUFL.  
203. For a discussion of the cap, see ELIZABETH A. STANTON ET AL., SYNAPSE 
ENERGY ECONOMICS, THE RGGI OPPORTUNITY: RGGI AS THE ELECTRIC SECTOR 
COMPLIANCE TOOL TO ACHIEVE 2030 STATE CLIMATE TARGETS 1–2 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/D6T2-7UK7.  
204. Harrison Fell & Peter Maniloff, Beneficial Leakage: The Effect of the Re-
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on Aggregate Emissions 23–24 (Colo. Sch. 
of Mines Div. of Econ. & Bus., Working Paper No. 2015-06, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/543W-8V6X (identifying a 2451.95 gigawatt-hours per 
month increase in imports into New York from PJM during RGGI’s imple-
mentation). But see ANDREW G. KINDLE ET AL., RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC 
INST. & NYISO, AN EMPIRICAL TEST FOR INTER-STATE CARBON-DIOXIDE 
EMISSIONS LEAKAGE RESULTING FROM THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE 19 (2011), https://perma.cc/MD2R-CYBS (finding no empirical ev-
idence of leakage in Pennsylvania-New York electricity transmission data 
from first year of RGGI’s operation).  
205. Fell & Maniloff, supra note 204. Fell and Maniloff find that in regions that 
export electricity to New York, RGGI’s carbon price seems to have prompted 
capacity factor increases of ten to eleven percent by gas-fired generation 
sources—but no increases by coal-fired sources. These have offset capacity 
factor reductions of seven to ten percent by New York-based coal-fired gen-
erators. Id. at 17–18. See also RGGI, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRICITY 
42https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1
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whether this fortuitous circumstance is likely to last, RGGI partic-
ipants have committed to examining options for improving the 
tracking of imports from outside RGGI and potentially adjusting 
the prices assigned to those imports to prevent leakage.206 
B. CES 
New York’s CES, adopted by the NYPSC in August 2016, aims 
by 2030 to reduce state-wide GHG emissions by forty percent from 
a 1990 baseline.207 While this 40 by 30 goal applies economy-wide, 
the bulk of emissions reductions are expected to come from the 
electricity sector, with New York aiming to generate half of its elec-
tricity using renewable energy sources.208 
The CES consists of three “tiers” of requirements for New York 
LSEs209 but is more usefully understood as a combination of two 
programs, one oriented to renewables (Tiers 1 and 2) and the other 
(Tier 3) to three of the state’s four nuclear power plants. As ex-
plained below, neither program assigns a price directly to carbon, 
but each assigns a price to “attributes” that include the non-emis-
sion of carbon. 
CES Tiers 1 and 2 extend and modify the state’s existing RPS, 
which required LSEs to collect a surcharge, payable to NYSERDA, 
and authorized NYSERDA to acquire “RPS attributes,” embodied 
in RECs, from renewable generators.210 This approach kept the 
REC market separate from the market for electricity and also al-
lowed NYSERDA to steer investments in utility-scale and smaller 
renewable generation developments. Under the new CES Order, 
LSEs can comply with the RPS by acquiring RECs from 
 
GENERATION AND IMPORTS IN THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: 
2013 MONITORING REPORT 6–7 (2016), https://perma.cc/8KVD-QDGW (re-
porting net imports from PJM and Quebec). 
206. See RGGI, RGGI 2012 PROGRAM REVIEW: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
ACCOMPANY MODEL RULE AMENDMENTS 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/6DKK-
KQYX.  
207. Case No. 15-E-0302, supra note 3. 
208. N.Y. STATE ENERGY PLANNING BD., supra note 1, at 112. 
209. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 14–19. 
210. For a description of the RPS first adopted in 2004, see 03-E-0188: Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. (June 3, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/6YTE-EPMV.   
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NYSERDA, from renewable generators directly or by making “Al-
ternative Compliance Payments” to NYSERDA.211 One qualifying 
REC is “produced” alongside each MWh of electricity produced by 
a renewable facility that began commercial operation after Janu-
ary 1, 2015.212 LSEs must acquire RECs in proportion to the an-
nual load they supply—0.6 percent of load supplied in 2017, 1.1 
percent in 2018, and up to 4.8 percent in 2021.213 
CES Tier 3 requires LSEs to purchase ZECs “produced” by 
three of the state’s four nuclear generating stations.214 As with the 
RECs required to be purchased under Tiers 1 and 2, the Tier 3 
ZECs place a value on a zero-emitting attribute and so are separate 
from the electric energy sold by the nuclear generators. However, 
three key alleged differences have led diverse parties to challenge 
Tier 3 on the grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause (“dCC”) and is pre-empted by the FPA, namely:215 
1. out-of-state generators cannot actually qualify to sell 
ZECs, even if there is no formal mechanism preventing 
them from doing so; 
2. ZEC prices will be set by the NYPSC and limited by whole-
sale market prices; and 
3. ZECs will soak up ratepayer spending in a way that is 
likely to suppress wholesale capacity market prices.216 
It appears that the Supreme Court’s recent Armstrong decision, 
which held that “[t]he Supremacy Clause . . . does not create a 
cause of action,”217 may well rescue the CES from challenges argu-
 
211. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 14–18, 94, 106–10. 
212. Id. at 103. 
213. Id. at 14. 
214. Id. at 43. 
215. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 35, Coalition 
for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, No. 16-CV-8164, 2017 WL 3172866 
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017). 
216. See NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 108 (“For the 
Year 2017 compliance period . . . [t]he REC price offered will equal the 
weighted average cost per MWh NYSERDA paid to acquire the RECs to be 
offered,” i.e., they will reflect the cost of developing and operating renewable 
generation, “plus a reasonable Commission-approved adder to cover the ad-
ministrative costs and fees incurred by NYSERDA to administer Tier 1.”). 
217. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015); see 
also Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951) 
(holding that FPA does not provide for any private right of action); cf. Allco 
Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2017) (petitioner brought case via 
44https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1
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ing that it is pre-empted by the FPA. Thus, Tier 3’s chief legal dan-
ger relates to challenges rooted in the dCC. 
VI. MECHANISMS OF A NYISO CARBON PRICING 
SCHEME 
Partly in response to adoption of the CES, NYISO launched 
the IPPP to evaluate options to “achieve New York’s . . . decarbon-
isation goals at least cost,” consistent with the operation of whole-
sale markets.218 The focus is on “approaches that would internalize 
the cost of carbon emissions” in markets.219 To that end, NYISO 
could set a dollar value for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted dur-
ing electricity generation (the “carbon price”), which would then be 
used to calculate a carbon fee for each generating unit reflecting 
its emissions profile. Ideally, this calculation would be based on the 
generating unit’s actual emissions220 as follows: 
Carbon fee ($ / MWh) = carbon price ($ / ton) × unit emis-
sions (tons / MWh) 
A carbon fee would be calculated for all in- and out-of-state gener-
ators bidding into energy markets administered by NYISO. While 
the same carbon price would be applied to all units, regardless of 
technology, the resulting carbon fee would vary depending on the 
fuel used. Coal-fired generating units would face the highest car-
bon fee, followed by oil and then natural gas. 
Each generating unit’s carbon fee would be added to its energy 
market bid to produce a dispatch cost which NYISO would use to 
determine the dispatch order. The likely effect would be a re-order-
ing of dispatch, with coal- and oil-fired generating units dispatched 
less frequently and natural gas and renewable generators more 
frequently, compared to the situation without a carbon fee (com-
pare examples 1 and 2). The dispatch cost of the marginal genera-
tor would determine the market-clearing price. Generators would 
receive that price less their carbon fee. 
 
cause of action expressly granted by Congress for claims arising under 
PURPA but not the FPA more generally). 
218. DeSocio, supra note 147, at Slide 5. 
219. Id. 
220. In the alternative, the calculation could be based on the carbon intensity of 
the fuel used by the generating facility and its heat rate. That is: carbon fee 
= carbon price × fuel carbon intensity × heat rate. 
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A. Setting the Carbon Price 
Various technical issues will need to be considered in design-
ing a carbon pricing scheme. Key among these is the level at which 
to set the carbon price. As discussed in Part C above, carbon pricing 
generally aims to internalize the external costs of carbon dioxide 
emissions.221 While the New York public policy triad of RGGI, 
RECs, and ZECs is based on multiple aims, at the root of all of 
them is the reflection in market prices of the cost of GHG emis-
sions, whether directly or in the form of a non-emitting attribute. 
To estimate the costs imposed by GHG emissions, the Obama Ad-
ministration developed the social cost of carbon (“SCC”), which re-
flects: 
the economic damages associated with a small increase in carbon 
dioxide . . . emissions, conventionally one metric ton, in a given 
year . . . . [It] is meant to be a comprehensive estimate of the cli-
mate change damages and includes, among other things, changes 
in agricultural productivity, human health, property damages 
from increased flood risk and changes in energy system costs, such 
 
221. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (2013, re-
vised 2015), https://perma.cc/3NCG-6ZQT.  
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as reduced costs for heating and increased costs for air condition-
ing.222 
The SCC was calculated by an interagency working group, in-
cluding representatives of EPA and other federal government 
agencies, convened by the Obama Administration.223 In March 
2017, the Trump Administration disbanded the interagency work-
ing group and rescinded the SCC, indicating that it should no 
longer be used in federal policy making.224 However, it continues 
to be used in many states, including New York, where the ZEC 
price is based in part on the SCC.225 
The SCC was calculated by quantifying the current and future 
damage expected to result from one metric ton of carbon dioxide.226 
That figure was then discounted back to present value to arrive at 
the SCC.227 The interagency working group used three different 
discount rates to calculate three SCCs shown in Table 1 below.228 
Each SCC increases over time as the incremental impact of emis-
sions rises in line with the atmospheric concentration of carbon di-
oxide.229 
 
222. EPA, FACT SHEET: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/ZQC7-
DB43.  
223. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS – 
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 4 (2010), https://perma.cc/Z655-ZQE8.  
224. Exec. Order No. 13,783, Promoting Energy Independent and Economic 
Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017). 
225. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 131. 
226. EPA, supra note 222, at 1.  
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 3 (indicating that the “values are based on the average [SCC] from 
three integrated assessment models, at discount rates of 5, 3, and 2.5 per-
cent . . . [A] fourth value [was estimated based on] the 95th percentile of the 
[SCC] from all three models at a 3 percent discount rate, and is intended to 
represent the potential for higher-than-average damages”). 
229. Id. at 1 (stating that the SCC “should increase over time because future 
emissions are expected to produce larger incremental damages as physical 
and economic systems become more stressed in response to greater levels of 
climate change”).  
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Table 1: SCC Calculated by the Federal Government230 











2015 $11 $36 $56 
2020 $12 $42 $62 
2025 $14 $46 $68 
2030 $16 $50 $73 
2035 $18 $55 $78 
2040 $21 $60 $84 
2045 $23 $64 $89 
2050 $26 $69 $95 
 
The SCC was developed to assist federal agencies in perform-
ing cost-benefit analyses during rulemaking.231 There is, however, 
support for its use in other contexts.232 It could be used by NYISO 
to set the carbon price to be incorporated into bids in the wholesale 
 
230. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, supra note 221, at 13.  
231. EPA, supra note 222, at 1; see also Zero Zone Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
832 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding agency’s use of SCC in cost-benefit 
analysis); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Hwy. Transp. Safety Bd., 538 
F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding environmental review and requiring 
agency to estimate cost imposed by GHG emissions).  
232. See, e.g., High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. 
Supp. 3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014) (suggesting that the SCC could be used to 
estimate the costs of increased carbon dioxide emissions in environmental 
reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act). See also Michael 
Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2017) 
(discussing the possibility of using the SCC in environmental reviews); Sa-
rah E. Light, NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon 
Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 545–46 (2013) (noting that the EPA 
has encouraged federal agencies to use the SCC in environmental reviews 
under the National Environmental Policy Act).  
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energy market. This would provide certainty for market partici-
pants, as the SCC is a robust metric, developed using technical 
models, with input from multiple government departments and the 
public. Recognizing this, in the context of ISO-NE’s IMAPP stake-
holder process, electric utility Exelon Corporation has recom-
mended using the SCC as the touchstone for pricing carbon in en-
ergy markets.233 
Despite this support, it is worth noting that the SCC is not 
universally accepted.234 Use of the SCC to price carbon in whole-
sale energy markets is likely to be opposed by some industry and 
other groups on the basis that it does not merely reflect the costs 
climate change imposes on electric grid operations but also in-
cludes various other costs (e.g., to the agricultural sector). Those 
costs are, however, an externality of electricity generation. As we 
explain in Part VII below, internalizing those external costs is nec-
essary to enhance competition in wholesale electricity markets and 
ensure that they operate effectively to produce just and reasonable 
rates. 
The SCC arguably provides the best metric for pricing the ex-
ternal costs of electricity generation’s carbon dioxide emissions. 
The lowest SCC, calculated using a five-percent discount rate, is 
consistent with the carbon prices currently used elsewhere in the 
electricity sector. For example: 
• It is below the implicit carbon price used by the EIA in cal-
culating the levelized cost of electricity (“LCOE”). The 
LCOE reflects the per-KWh cost of building and operating 
an electric generating plant over an assumed financial life 
and duty cycle, taking into account capital, operation, 
maintenance, and financing costs.235 When calculating the 
LCOE, the EIA includes a three-percent cost of capital ad-
 
233. Exelon Corporation, “Using Carbon Pricing in Dispatch to Meet the IMAPP 
Process Goals,” Slide 1 (Aug. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/6RJQ-Q9K3.  
234. For a discussion of opposition to the SCC, see Bruce Lieberman, Social Cost 
of Carbon: A Continuing Little-Told Story, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS 
(Sept. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/C49E-8Z47.  See also David Malakoff et al., 
Trump Team Targets Changes to Key Metric that Calculates Social Cost of 
Carbon, SCI. INSIDER (Dec. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/PKM5-6BVM.  
235. EIA, LEVELIZED COST & LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION 
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der for carbon-intensive generating units, such as those us-
ing coal.236 The impact of this, according to the EIA, is 
“similar to that of an emissions fee of $15 per metric ton of 
carbon dioxide.”237 
• It is in line with the carbon price implicit in California’s 
cap-and-trade program.238 As part of the cap-and-trade 
program, California has adopted an allowance auction sys-
tem, with a minimum or “reserve” price which functions as 
a minimum carbon fee.239 That fee was $12.73 in 2016240 
and will rise to $13.57 in 2017.241 
• It is in line with, and in some cases less than, the carbon 
prices used internally by electric utilities. A number of util-
ities use a carbon price, for example, in their integrated 
resource planning processes. These include Xcel Energy 
Inc., which uses prices in the range of $9 to $34 per ton, 
Sempra Energy, which uses a price of about $13 per ton, 
NiSource Inc., which uses a price of $20 per ton, and 
Ameren Corporation, which uses prices in the range of $23 





236. The EIA asserts that the adder is necessary as, “[b]ecause regulators and 
the investment community have continued to push energy companies to in-
vest in technologies that are less greenhouse gas-intensive, there is consid-
erable financial risk associated with major investments in long-lived power 
plants with a relatively higher rate of carbon dioxide emissions.” Id. at 3. 
237. EIA, LEVELIZED COST & LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION 
RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 3 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/L8SK-CKEQ.  
238. See supra Part 3. 
239. Auction Information, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://perma.cc/27HD-2CTG (dis-
cussing the auction reserve price which establishes the minimum at which 
allowances will be sold). 
240. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM AND QUÉBEC CAP-
AND-TRADE SYSTEM: 2016 ANNUAL AUCTION RESERVE PRICE NOTICE 1 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/NC69-2SQW.  
241. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM AND QUÉBEC CAP-
AND-TRADE SYSTEM: 2017 ANNUAL AUCTION RESERVE PRICE NOTICE 1 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/7TG7-A57V.   
242. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT (“CBD”), PUTTING A PRICE ON RISK: CARBON 
PRICING IN THE CORPORATE WORLD 62 (2015), https://perma.cc/B4R2-7ZDP.   
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Given the above, NYISO may elect to use the lowest SCC, cal-
culated using a discount rate of five percent, to mitigate cost im-
pacts. That would result in an initial carbon price of $12.82.243 
B. Carbon Price Adjustment 
Economists generally agree that carbon prices should rise over 
time to reflect the fact that, as more carbon accumulates in the 
atmosphere, the incremental damage caused by one additional ton 
increases.244 Consistent with this view, the SCC rises steadily from 
$11 in 2015 to $21 in 2040 and to $26 in 2050 (see Table 1 above). 
At the time of establishing a carbon pricing scheme, NYISO 
should adopt procedures specifying when and how price adjust-
ments will be made. Ideally, to maximize certainty and predicta-
bility for the private sector, adjustments should be made at prede-
fined intervals. NYISO could, for example, adjust prices every five 
years in line with the SCC. Assuming NYISO elects to use the low-
est SCC (i.e., calculated using a five-percent discount rate), this 
would result in a modest increase in carbon prices over the next 
two decades, mitigating the impact on costs. 
C. Interaction with Other Carbon Prices 
1. Interaction with RGGI 
Some electric generators bidding into NYISO markets are al-
ready subject to carbon pricing through RGGI. It is important that 
any NYISO carbon pricing scheme avoid requiring generators—di-
rectly or indirectly—to pay twice for the same emissions (i.e., once 
to comply with the NYISO MST and once to comply with RGGI). 
The RGGI price should, therefore, be deducted from whatever car-
bon price NYISO adds to covered generators’ bids. The CES, which 
confronts the same problem when deriving a ZEC price, solves it 
by subtracting two values from the SCC. The first is a fixed projec-
tion of the RGGI price, borrowed from NYISO’s CARIS model, 
which anticipates patterns of and costs arising from transmission 
 
243. The 2015 SCC value, calculated using a five-percent discount rate, is $11 in 
2007. After adjusting for inflation, that is equivalent to $12.82 in 2016 dol-
lars. 
244. See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, The Promise and Problems of 
Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience, 21 J. ENV’T & DEV. 152, 155 (2012). 
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grid congestion.245 The second value is a hybrid of independent 
forecasts of NYISO’s energy and capacity markets whose projec-
tions capture anticipated changes to RGGI’s carbon price.246 
2. Interaction with New York’s CES 
FERC has determined that it does not have jurisdiction over 
markets for RECs unbundled from markets for energy or capac-
ity.247 Thus, Tiers 1 and 2 of New York’s CES can operate in par-
allel with a wholesale market carbon price without legal conse-
quence. Tier 3, however, establishes a ZEC price that is both 
derived from the SCC and constrained by NYISO energy market 
prices.248 Some of the litigants in the current dispute over New 
York’s CES argue that these features make the ZEC price poten-
tially subject to FERC’s jurisdiction (see Part 5.2 above), as well as 
logically duplicative of any carbon price based on the SCC. Conse-
quently, if NYISO’s carbon price were to derive from the SCC, then 
NYISO and the NYPSC would have to decide which price would 
accommodate or displace the other. Otherwise, given their common 
goal (correcting electricity prices to better reflect the value of avoid-
ing the adverse effects of climate change), both would impose costs 
that, combined, exceed the value they aim to approximate, namely 
a version of the SCC. This logical failing would be legally problem-
atic as well because it would belie the argument that the carbon 
pricing scheme improves wholesale price formation by more accu-
rately incorporating costs that are relevant but were heretofore ig-
nored.249 
Ultimately, either accommodating or displacing Tier 3 of the 
CES would mean applying a carbon price more or less uniformly to 
all the generation sources subject to NYISO’s tariff. The key differ-
ences between the two approaches would relate to implementation. 
Accommodation would mean crafting a new mechanism that alters 
 
245. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 57, 131, 135–36. 
246. Those forecasts pertain to Zone A, where no nuclear facilities are located. 
This lowers ZEC prices at times when electricity prices are expected to in-
crease. 
247. WSPP, Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061, 61,425 (Apr. 20, 2012) (clarifying that 
FERC has jurisdiction over bundled REC and energy transactions, but not 
over unbundled REC-only transactions). 
248. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 131 & 150. 
249. See infra Part VII. 
52https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1
   
2017] Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets 53 
non-nuclear generator bid prices, operates alongside the CES, and 
leaves the ZEC prices paid to three nuclear generators undis-
turbed. Displacement would mean eliminating Tier 3 and simply 
modifying the bid prices of all generators based on the carbon con-
tent of their fuel. Practically, displacement would be far simpler; 
politically, both are fraught. 
D. Likely Effect on Wholesale Electricity Prices 
Adoption of a carbon pricing scheme by NYISO will, in the 
short run, likely lead to an increase in the market-clearing price of 
electricity. The amount of that increase will depend on the carbon 
dioxide emissions profile of the marginal generator, since, as de-
scribed above, prices will be set equal to that generator’s bid plus 
a carbon fee based on its emissions. Average emissions from vari-
ous classes of generating units are shown in Table 2. Based on 
those averages and assuming a carbon price of $12.82,250 the table 
shows the carbon fee for each class of generator. 








Coal – Lignite 1.09 tons $13.97 
Coal – Subbituminous 1.08 tons $13.85 
Coal – Bituminous 1.04 tons $13.33 
Oil – Residual (No. 6) 0.88 tons $11.28 
Oil – Residual (No. 2) 0.82 tons $10.51 
Natural Gas 0.61 tons $7.82 
 
 
250. See supra Part A. 
251. EIA, supra note 152 (estimating the number of pounds of carbon dioxide 
produced per KWh of electricity generated, based on the average heat rates 
for steam electric generators in 2014). 
252. Calculated assuming a carbon price of $12.82 per ton. 
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Currently, in NYISO markets, natural-gas-fired resources are 
the marginal source of supply in most intervals.253 It is unclear 
whether that will remain the case after introduction of a carbon 
pricing scheme. We anticipate some reordering of resources but 
cannot determine exactly how the supply mix will change and/or 
whether gas will remain at the margin. This will depend on a num-
ber of factors, including each generator’s cost and emissions profile, 
as shown in simplified example 2 above. Further complicating mat-
ters, there will likely also be a demand response, which affects dis-
patch. For example, if higher prices reduce electricity demand, 
fewer generating units may need to be dispatched, leading to a 
change in the marginal unit.254 
In intervals when natural gas is at the margin, the market-
clearing price would increase by around $8 (per MWh), depending 
on the marginal generator’s actual emissions. Should coal be at the 
margin, the market clearing price increase would be around $14 
(per MWh). Each generator would receive the market-clearing 
price less their carbon fee. Thus, as the carbon fee is highest for 
fossil fuel generators, there would be an incentive to increase in-
vestment in renewable and other low-carbon generation. In the 
long run, the market-clearing price may decrease as the generating 
fleet becomes less carbon intensive and low- and zero-emitting gen-
erators are increasingly on the margin. Such a decrease could be 
partially or wholly offset by increases in the carbon price. Such in-
creases could cause the market-clearing price to rise over time. 
E. Options for Re-distributing Revenues 
To offset increased wholesale electricity prices, revenues gen-
erated through the carbon pricing scheme should be reimbursed to 
LSEs and other buyers in an equitable manner. This could be 
achieved in several ways. One option is to require LSEs to pay the 
full market-clearing price, including the amount of any carbon fee. 
Each generator would receive that price, less their unit specific car-
bon fee, which would be retained by NYISO. The retained funds 
could then be equitably refunded to LSEs. States could direct LSEs 
 
253. PATTON ET AL., supra note 67, at 7 (indicating that natural gas-fired re-
sources were the marginal source of supply in 67 percent of intervals in 2013 
and 2015).  
254. For a discussion of this issue, see Jos Sijm et al., CO2 Cost Pass-Through 
and Windfall Profits in the Power Sector, 6 CLIMATE POL’Y 49 (2006).  
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to use the refunded amount to mitigate end-customer bill impacts 
or fund state policy goals (e.g., energy efficiency investments). 
Studies suggest that, where the refunds are passed through to cus-
tomers, any increase in retail bills is likely to be minimal. By way 
of example, Exelon estimated an increase in retail bills of just one 
to two percent, assuming a carbon price of $20 per ton.255 Another 
study for the Clean Air Task Force estimated that, with a carbon 
price of $34 per ton, retail rates would increase by 4.1 percent.256 
Ideally, refunds to LSEs should not be tied to their specific 
purchases in energy markets to avoid dampening any demand re-
sponse.257 NYISO could, for example, provide periodic refunds 
based on each LSE’s share of total load during the period. Refunds 
would not be tied to LSEs’ actual share of carbon fees, meaning 
that all LSEs would receive the same amount per MWh of electric-
ity purchased, regardless of whether purchases are made during 
times of low or high fees. 
Similar refund schemes have been adopted by ISO/RTOs in 
other circumstances. For instance, since 2007, PJM has included 
the marginal cost of transmission line losses in energy market 
prices.258 As marginal losses rise exponentially with transmission 
system flows, they exceed average losses, resulting in PJM over-
collecting revenues relative to costs.259 PJM refunds the excess to 
buyers on a monthly basis, in proportion to each buyer’s MW usage 
 
255. Assuming that the revenues from the carbon price were applied to retail bill 
relief programs. See Exelon Corporation, Comments of Exelon Corporation 
on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Proposed Carbon Pollution 
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources 19, 33 (Dec. 1, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/EK3C-3DPP.  
256. BRUCE PHILLIPS, THE NORTHBRIDGE GRP., ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR 
REGULATING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING POWER PLANTS 
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: PRACTICAL PATHWAYS TO MEANINGFUL 
REDUCTIONS 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/2QXX-MP33.  
257. See supra Part D. 
258. Atlantic City Electric Co. v. PJM Interconnection, 115 FERC ¶ 61,132, 
61,474 (May 1, 2006). For a discussion of this decision and its relevance to 
carbon pricing in wholesale electricity markets, see STEVEN WEISSMAN & 
ROMANY WEBB, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF LAW, ADDRESSING 
CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION: HOW THE FEDERAL ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMMISSION CAN USE ITS EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REDUCE 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND INCREASE CLEAN ENERGY USE 10–11 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/LFV6-DZ3K.   
259. Atlantic City Electric Co., 115 FERC at ¶ 61,478.  
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rather than its actual contribution to the surplus funds.260 A simi-
lar marginal loss collection and refund scheme is used by 
CAISO.261 FERC has approved both the CAISO and PJM schemes; 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has 
upheld FERC’s approval of the PJM scheme.262 
As an alternative to collecting and then refunding carbon fees, 
ISO/RTOs could adjust the electricity prices paid by LSEs and 
other buyers to reflect the market-clearing price less the average 
carbon fee for all dispatched generators (see example 3 below). This 
approach would dampen the demand response to the carbon pric-
ing scheme, as LSEs would face a lower price compared to when 
the adder is collected by NYISO. It is, however, likely to be simpler 
to administer than the refund schemes described above. 
F. Monitoring and Reporting 
To successfully implement a carbon pricing scheme, data will 
be required on each generator’s carbon dioxide emissions to calcu-
late the carbon fee to be added to its bids. The required data is 
already recorded in the New York Generator Attribute Tracking 
System (“NYGATS”). Maintained by NYSERDA, NYGATS tracks 
the environmental attributes of electricity generated within New 
York as well as that imported to the state.263 For each MWh of 
electricity, NYGATS records the generation source (whether in or 
out of state) and key characteristics of that source, including its 
carbon dioxide emissions rate.264 The emissions data is entered by 
NYISO, based on reports filed by generators participating in its 
market. 
 
260. Atlantic City Electric Co., v. PJM Interconnection, 117 FERC ¶ 61,169 
(2006). 
261. California Independent System Operator, 116 FERC ¶ 61,274 (Sept. 21, 
2006), order on reh’g, 119 FERC ¶ 61,076 (Apr. 20, 2007). 
262. Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 2013). FERC’s 
approval of the CAISO scheme was not appealed to the courts.  
263. New York Generation Attribute Tracking System (NYGATS), NYSERDA, 
https://perma.cc/V5KH-79WW. See also NYSERDA, “New York Generation 
Attribute Tracking System (NYGATS) Stakeholder Meeting,” Slide 8 (Apr. 
13, 2017), https://perma.cc/G9BR-WA4E.   
264. Id. at Slide 14. 
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VII. DOES THE LAW PERMIT NYISO TO PRICE 
CARBON? 
Any NYISO carbon pricing scheme would be subject to FERC 
review. As explained in Part C above, under the FPA, FERC is re-
sponsible for overseeing wholesale electricity rates to ensure that 
they are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or prefer-
ential. The FPA requires public utilities, including ISO/RTOs, to 
submit to FERC proposed changes to their rates or practices affect-
ing rates.265 
FERC has traditionally shown great deference to ISO/RTOs to 
formulate market rules as they see fit.266 FERC may approve an 
amended NYISO tariff establishing new market rules, without 
finding that the existing tariff is deficient or that the amended tar-
iff is somehow superior.267 The applicable standard requires only 
that the amended tariff be just, reasonable, and not unduly dis-
criminatory or preferential. 
A. Including a Carbon Price in Wholesale Electricity 
Rates is Just and Reasonable 
This sub-part presents two distinct lines of argument support-
ing the conclusion that carbon pricing in NYISO markets is just 
and reasonable. The first is the bolder of the two and builds on the 
premise that FERC has wide latitude to authorize a NYISO pro-
posal aimed at improving the functioning of its wholesale markets. 
The second resembles arguments made elsewhere for adopting a 
wholesale carbon price: it reflects and rationalizes state public pol-
icy. As noted in the introduction, though these arguments are dis-
tinct from one another, they are not mutually exclusive. Im-
portantly, these arguments are intended to justify inclusion of a 
carbon price of some sort in NYISO’s tariff and do not address the 
level at which any such price should be set. That issue is discussed 
in Part 3 below. 
 
 
265. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d). 
266. Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of 
the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Trans-
mission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 555 (2007).  
267. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d). 
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1. Argument 1: Improving the Functioning of Wholesale 
Markets Administered by NYISO 
Argument 1(a): A carbon price would enhance competi-
tion in NYISO markets. As discussed in Part C above, FERC con-
siders rates to be just and reasonable if they are set in well-func-
tioning, competitive wholesale energy markets. FERC regulates 
markets to mitigate the exercise of market power and otherwise 
enhance competition, viewing such regulatory intervention as “in-
tegral to . . . fulfilling its statutory mandate under the FPA to en-
sure supplies of electric energy at just [and] reasonable” prices.268 
FERC put this premise to the test in 2011 when, in Order 745,269 
it required ISO/RTOs to pay the full LMP to qualifying demand-
response resources on the grounds that promoting “meaningful de-
mand-side participation” in wholesale markets would increase 
competition in those markets with salutary effects on prices.270 
The Supreme Court ultimately endorsed FERC’s logic in FERC v. 
Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”).271 
In upholding Order 745, the Court in EPSA noted that FERC 
“undertakes to ensure just and reasonable wholesale rates by en-
hancing competition—attempting . . . to break down regulatory 
and economic barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale elec-
tricity.”272 The Court emphasized that Order 745 is intended “to 
improve how [the wholesale energy] market runs.”273 According to 
the Court, FERC’s “justifications for regulating demand response 
are all about, and only about, improving the wholesale market. . . . 
FERC explained that demand response participation could help 
create a ‘well-functioning competitive’” market with reduced rates 
and enhanced reliability.274 
The decision in EPSA suggests that FERC has broad authority 
to promote competition in wholesale markets as a means to ensure 
just and reasonable rates. Based on EPSA, at least two commenta-
tors have suggested that FERC could approve an ISO/RTO-
 
268. Order No. 745, Fed. Reg. 16,657, 16,659–60, 16,676 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified 
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).   
269. Id. at 16,659. 
270. Id.  
271. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2015). 
272. Id. at 768. 
273. Id. at 776. 
274. Id. at 776–77. 
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proposed carbon price as just and reasonable, so long as evidence 
demonstrates that the adder would enhance competition.275 
Peskoe, who makes this argument in relation to ISO-NE, empha-
sizes that FERC’s approval “may be on more solid legal ground” if 
the adder is designed to achieve specific competitive outcomes in-
dependent of the environmental harm caused by carbon dioxide 
emissions.276 Thus, Peskoe stops short of endorsing what has been 
called “social-cost dispatch”—the adjustment of market-based 
rates so that they reflect social costs rather than private ones.277 
Weissman and Webb, writing before the EPSA decision, ar-
gued that including the social cost of carbon dioxide emissions in 
rates is necessary to enhance competition in wholesale markets: 
[L]ess-polluting generators are placed at a competitive disad-
vantage when more-polluting generators can mask the true cost of 
power by ignoring externalities . . . The existence of environmental 
externalities represents [a] kind of market failure to which FERC 
could . . . respond by adjusting the bid price . . . [In doing so, 
FERC’s] objective would be to stimulate the development of gener-
ating units that will impose the lowest cost on society and remove 
[a] market distortion—the ability of some generators to undercut 
their competitors by escaping responsibility for their environmen-
tal costs.278 
This reasoning takes the characterization of environmental exter-
nalities as being outside of FERC’s remit and stands it on its head. 
By Weissman and Webb’s logic, ignoring environmental externali-
ties means giving some market participants an unfair competitive 
 
275. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Elec-
tric Grid, 49 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1788 (2016) (“[FERC] can even take 
an ‘environmental’ action—such as addressing climate change through a 
carbon adder—if it has a direct relationship to wholesale rates.”); Ari 
Peskoe, Integrating Markets and Public Policy in New England 9 (Oct, 27, 
2016) (discussion draft), https://perma.cc/MWY8-FQDK (stating that FERC 
could approve a carbon adder if it “can conclude that there is adequate sup-
port in the record that [the] proposal furthers that goal” of enhancing com-
petition). 
276. Peskoe, supra note 275, at 28. 
277. Bateman & Tripp, supra note 175, at 330. 
278. WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 258, at 4, 6. 
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advantage over others and thereby impairing market competitive-
ness.279 This view sees an analogy between compensating emitting 
and non-emitting generators at the same rate and compensating 
generation and demand response at different rates. FERC Order 
745 eliminated the latter distinction on the grounds that inade-
quate compensation inhibited wholesale market participation by 
demand response resources, which, in turn, kept average rates 
higher than necessary and, more generally, reduced competition in 
wholesale energy markets. In the case of a carbon price, FERC 
would be acting to facilitate the participation of low-carbon gener-
ators that, like demand response resources, are inadequately com-
pensated for the services they provide because rates do not reflect 
their zero-emission attributes. Adopting a carbon price would en-
sure that rates more accurately reflect the value that low- and 
high-carbon electricity sources deliver and, thus, level the compet-
itive playing field. 
Another, more recent example of FERC action to enhance com-
petition in wholesale markets is its draft order on electric storage 
resources’ participation in wholesale markets.280 That draft order 
pertains to a wide array of storage technologies (fly wheels, batter-
ies, compressed air, and others) capable of charging and discharg-
ing electricity.281 According to FERC, this capability “provides 
[storage] resources with significant operational flexibility,” ena-
bling them to deliver various grid services.282 Currently, however, 
storage resources’ participation in wholesale markets is limited by 
the fact that they “often must use existing participation models de-
signed for traditional generation or load resources.”283 FERC’s 
draft order seeks to adjust the parameters that wholesale markets 
use to determine resource participation and valuation to better 
capture evident but unrealized benefits to market participants: 
 
279. See Bateman & Tripp, supra note 175, at 304 (“[B]y not incorporating GHG 
externalities into its rate regulation, FERC influences decisions about what 
generation should be built just as much as it would by incorporating these 
externalities. The effect of its exclusion of the externalities is simply to give 
GHG-intensive generation, such as coal, an advantage vis-à-vis cleaner en-
ergy, such as wind.”). 
280. See Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Trans-
mission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 
86,522 (Nov. 17, 2016) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
281. Id. at 86,525. 
282. Id.  
283. Id.  
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We take action in this NOPR so that electric storage resources will 
be able to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets 
to the extent they are technically capable of doing so based on rules 
that take into account their unique characteristics and not based 
on market rules designed for the unique characteristics of other 
types of resources . . . Current tariffs that do not recognize the op-
erational characteristics of electric storage resources serve to limit 
the participation of electric storage resources in the organized 
wholesale electric markets and result in inefficient use of these re-
sources.284 
FERC’s instructions to ISO/RTOs to revise their participation mod-
els are technology-neutral and recognize the indispensable role of 
aggregators in integrating storage technologies meaningfully into 
grid operations.285 Their objective is straightforward: level the 
competitive playing field for technologies with a particular capa-
bility—i.e., “receiving electric energy from the grid and storing it 
for later injection of electricity back to the grid regardless of where 
the resource is located on the electrical system”—that has to date 
been undervalued.286 The approach to NYISO carbon pricing pro-
posed here would also improve wholesale markets’ valuation of a 
particular capability or attribute, namely low- or non-emitting 
electricity generation. 
The playing field is particularly skewed in NYISO markets, 
which are affected not only by the current failure to internalize 
carbon externalities at the wholesale level but also by state policies 
adopted in more or less direct response to that failure. The policies, 
described in Part V above, effectively attach a value to generators’ 
carbon-related attributes. They do not, however, apply equally to 
all generators with the same attributes. Just 76 of New York’s 
roughly 170 fossil fuel generators have their carbon dioxide emis-
sions priced through RGGI.287 Some low-carbon generators that 
operate renewable energy sources are compensated for their zero-
 
284. Id.  
285. Id. at 86,523–24. 
286. Id. at 86,525. 
287. Generators with a capacity of 25MW or more are required to purchase al-
lowances through RGGI. See RGGI, Regulated Sources, supra note 173. For 
a list of covered facilities in New York, see RGGI, New York: Facility Infor-
mation, supra note 173.  
61
  
62 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35 
emission attributes through REC sales.288 Such compensation is 
not, however, consistently available to non-renewable low-carbon 
generators.289 Finally, three, but not all four, of the state’s nuclear 
generators receive compensation from ZEC sales which is not 
available to renewable generators.290 
Due to their partial application, state policies provide only in-
complete and inchoate remedies for the market failure described 
above and arguably further distort the market, thereby impairing 
effective competition among wholesale buyers and sellers. The pol-
icies give some market participants a competitive advantage over 
others with the same attributes. RGGI, for example, increases the 
costs faced by large fossil fuel generators due to the need to pur-
chase emission allowances. Those generators are, therefore, forced 
to bid into the market at higher prices. Smaller fossil fuel genera-
tors (i.e., that are not subject to RGGI) can, however, continue 
making bids that exclude the cost of emissions and, thus, undercut 
their competitors.291 Similarly, as a result of the CES, nuclear 
power plants can undercut fossil fuel and other generators. The 
CES increases the return nuclear power plants receive for electric-
ity sold in wholesale markets, creating an incentive for them to re-
duce their bids (i.e., to ensure they are dispatched), thereby putting 
downward pressure on market prices. This is likely to affect the 
financial viability of other generators, both low- and high-carbon, 
impeding their ongoing participation in wholesale markets. 
We note that some commentators have disputed FERC’s au-
thority to adjust wholesale market prices to internalize the exter-
nal costs of carbon dioxide emissions.292 Moot, for example, has ar-
gued that such costs are fundamentally extrinsic to wholesale 
markets and, thus, beyond FERC’s legal domain.293 He states: 
 
288. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 16, Appendix A (in-
dicating that RECs may be produced and sold by resources that came into 
operation after January 1, 2015 and use certain renewable resources to gen-
erate electricity).  
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 128 (indicating that the FitzPatrick, Ginna, and Nine Mile Point nu-
clear generators will be eligible to receive ZEC payments). 
291. This is because smaller generators, with a capacity less than 25MW, are not 
required to purchase allowances through RGGI. See RGGI, Regulated 
Sources, supra note 173.   
292. See, e.g., Moot, supra note 9.  
293. Id. at 358–61. 
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FERC can remove barriers to participation by renewable resources 
in wholesale power markets . . . if those barriers constitute an un-
due preference. That preference must relate to a matter within 
FERC’s jurisdiction, however, not a matter committed to the juris-
diction of other governmental bodies. Just as the FERC cannot 
remedy perceived inequities in the tax code by withholding whole-
sale market revenues from firms allegedly taking advantage of tax 
loopholes, it cannot counteract Congress’ failure to enact cap-and-
trade or carbon tax legislation by creating its own program 
through a wholesale market design change.294 
In our view, however, FERC approval of a NYISO carbon price 
would not amount to an extension of environmental policy by other 
means. Rather, it would be a logical application of the principles 
that have long guided FERC’s management of wholesale markets. 
While we agree with Moot that neither the FPA nor other federal 
legislation expressly authorizes FERC to address emissions, that 
would not be FERC’s primary purpose in approving a carbon price. 
FERC’s purpose would be to enhance wholesale market operations 
and promote competition, much as it has done in other instances 
where it has lacked express legislative sanction but has proceeded 
anyway.295 
Argument 1(b): A carbon pricing scheme would ensure 
proper wholesale price formation. In considering FERC’s au-
thority to approve a carbon pricing scheme following EPSA, it is 
important to bear in mind the features of Order 745. Most notably, 
as the Supreme Court observed, the order “is all about” reducing 
wholesale electricity prices.296 In contrast, a carbon pricing scheme 
is likely to increase wholesale electricity prices, at least in the short 
run.297 In the long run, however, prices should fall as the generat-
ing fleet becomes less carbon intensive.298 In contrast, from the 
start, the costs of generation will likely fall. While electricity prices 
 
294. Id. at 361. 
295. See supra Part A. 
296. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2015). As noted above, Order 745 aims to promote 
the participation of demand-response resources in wholesale markets by 
compensating them at the full LMP. Such compensation is, however, only 
required where resources pass a net benefits test indicating that their dis-
patch will result in lower wholesale prices (i.e., compared to if all load was 
met with generation). 
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and costs are often assumed to be equivalent,299 in fact, costs cur-
rently exceed prices due to the presence of externalities. These ex-
ternalities reflect a cost to society—one that, in our view, must be 
incorporated into prices if they are to provide clear signals to mar-
ket participants and investors. 
FERC has recently emphasized the importance of proper price 
formation to, among other things, maximize market surplus and 
incentivize investment.300 According to FERC Commissioner 
Cheryl LaFleur, to achieve these objectives, prices must “reflect the 
true cost of reliable operations.”301 The near-term effects of climate 
change—warmer ambient temperatures, heat waves, less reliable 
access to water, and more frequent and intense storms—have clear 
import for system reliability. These effects will impair generation 
and transmission facility efficiency,302 undermining reliability and 
creating costs, which must be reflected in prices to provide correct 
 
299. In EPSA, the court uses the terms “price” and “cost” interchangeably. Com-
pare EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 778 (indicating that “wholesale market operators 
accept demand response bids only if those offers lower the wholesale price” 
(emphasis added)), with id. at 782 (stating operators will accept a bid “so 
long as that bid can satisfy a ‘net benefits test’—meaning that it is sure to 
bring down costs” (emphasis added)).  
300. Price Formation in Energy and Ancillary Services Markets Operated by Re-
gional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators; No-
tice Inviting Post-Technical Workshop Comments, 80 Fed. Reg. 3,580 (Jan. 
23, 2015). 
301. FERC, TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: PRICE FORMATION IN ENERGY AND AUXILIARY 
SERVICES MARKETS OPERATED BY REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS 
AND INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATORS 6 (2014), https://perma.cc/YAM8-
L6FE.  
302. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER 10 (2013), https://perma.cc/62TQ-VUCN 
(indicating that, in natural gas and coal units, “heat is used to produce high-
pressure steam, which is expanded over a turbine to produce electricity. The 
driving force for the process is the phase change of the steam to a liquid 
following the turbine . . . A vacuum is created in the condensation process 
that draws the steam over the turbine. This low pressure is critical to the 
thermodynamic efficiency of the process. Increased backpressure will lower 
the efficiency of the generation process. Increases in ambient air tempera-
tures and cooling water temperatures will increase steam condensate tem-
peratures and turbine backpressure, reducing power generation effi-
ciency.”); see also Order Approving Electric, Gas and Steam Rate Plans in 
Accord with Joint Proposal, Case No. 13-E-0030 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
Feb. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/RCU5-ZKQS; SOFIA AIVALIOTI, SABIN CTR. 
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, ELECTRICITY SECTOR ADAPTATION TO HEAT WAVES 
(2015), https://perma.cc/93FG-8NHF.   
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incentives for investment in new facilities. Put another way: cli-
mate change is imposing costs on the electric grid and its end users 
that wholesale markets currently interpret as noise rather than 
signal; carbon pricing would serve to translate that signal into 
price effects and thereby more accurately reflect the value that 
high- and low-carbon sources of electricity deliver. 
FERC has recently taken steps to ensure that market prices 
more fully account for the cost of generation. In Order 825, for ex-
ample, FERC directed market operators to implement various re-
forms aimed at ensuring that prices more accurately reflect energy 
and reserve shortages303 so that generators “are compensated for 
the value of the service that they provide” and, thus, face the cor-
rect incentives to invest in enhancing reliability.304 While Order 
825 relates to the pricing of features endogenous to wholesale mar-
kets, FERC has also dealt with exogenous features in the past. 
FERC has previously adjusted wholesale market prices to achieve 
public policy objectives such as reduced transmission line losses.305 
In 2006, FERC ordered PJM to include an uplift charge—equal to 
the marginal cost of line losses—in wholesale prices to cover the 
cost of energy lost during transmission. According to Weissman 
and Webb: 
FERC’s decision to require marginal loss pricing was made on pol-
icy grounds and aimed to ensure that prices provide the strongest 
signal possible to encourage more efficient use of the transmission 
system . . .  FERC emphasized that use of this methodology would 
reduce electricity supply costs and thereby increase electricity 
market efficiency [stating]: “by changing to the marginal losses 
method, PJM would change the way that it dispatches generators 
 
303. FERC noted that “some RTOs/ISOs currently restrict the use of shortage 
pricing to certain causes of shortages, or some RTOs/ISOs require a shortage 
to exist for a minimum amount of time before triggering shortage pricing.” 
See Order No. 825, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,881, 42,894 (June 30, 2016) (codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 35). FERC determined that “existing shortage pricing triggers 
that do not invoke shortage pricing when there is a shortage (regardless of 
duration or cause) are unjust and unreasonable.” Id. FERC therefore re-
quired “each RTO/ISO to trigger shortage pricing for any interval in which 
a shortage of energy or operating reserves is indicated.” Id. at 42,900. 
304. Id. at 42,884. 
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by considering the effects of [transmission line] losses. As a re-
sult . . . the total cost of meeting load would be reduced.”306 
Just as line losses create a burden for buyers and sellers of elec-
tricity, justifying market rule adjustments, so too do carbon dioxide 
emissions and associated climate change. Both lead to reduced sys-
tem reliability and, thus, increased costs for market participants. 
Adopting a carbon price would internalize the external costs of 
emissions, ensuring that they are taken into account by market 
operators when dispatching generators, and thereby causing elec-
tricity demand to be served by the lowest cost resources. 
2. Argument 2: Ensuring orderly development of the 
electric system 
Argument 2(a): Wholesale carbon pricing reflective of 
diverse state policies would, in the short run, harmonize 
those policies. As discussed in Part C, in exercising its authority 
to set just and reasonable rates, FERC must balance the interests 
of suppliers and customers.307 FERC must also ensure protection 
of the public interest.308 This does not, however, give FERC “a 
broad license to promote the general public welfare.”309 Rather, as 
the Supreme Court has observed, it “is a charge to promote the or-
derly production of plentiful supplies of electric energy” at reason-
able prices.310 Achieving this goal in the age of climate change 
means ensuring that prices provide appropriate signals for invest-
ment in low-carbon generation consistent with state policy.311 In 
the short run, this means rationalizing the current patchwork of 
carbon-related electricity pricing policies in New York. In the long 
run, it means ensuring that market participants align their plans 
 
306. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
307. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). 
308. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 
(1956) (declaring that “the purpose of the power given the Commission by 
§ 206(a) [i.e., to set just and reasonable rates] is the protection of the public 
interest”). 
309. NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1972). 
310. Id. at 670.  
311. See generally TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURES (2016), https://perma.cc/W45A-NH47 (characterizing catego-
ries of investment risk arising from climate change). 
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with existing and foreseeable future legal requirements.312 
Some but not all NYISO market participants are subject to 
state policies aimed at supporting the transition to low-carbon elec-
tricity generation. As discussed in Part 1 above, the patchwork of 
state policies provides partial coverage of New York generators 
with respect to carbon emissions. It also imposes diverse price lev-
els on those emissions or their absence: REC values derive from an 
independent market whose participants must comply with the 
state’s RPS; ZEC values derive from a formula derived from the 
SCC; and RGGI allowance prices derive from an interstate allow-
ance-trading market. As of January 2017, REC purchasers paid 
$21.16 per MWh,313 ZEC purchasers $17.54 per MWh,314 and 
RGGI participants $3.55 per short ton of carbon dioxide,315 which 
translates to about $2.17/MWh for natural-gas-fired generators 
and $3.67 for bituminous-coal-fired ones.316 
Partial coverage and diverse pricing complicates and distorts 
the values transmitted via wholesale electricity markets to partic-
ipants, thereby impairing efficient planning and investment. This 
situation is ripe for improvement via the sort of rationalization 
that a more uniformly applicable wholesale carbon price would pro-
vide. 
Argument 2(b): Wholesale carbon pricing reflective of 
state-level public policy would improve long-run planning. 
A harmonizing wholesale carbon price would also help ensure or-
derly electric system development over the long term. New York 
policymakers responsible for the electric grid have long recognized 
the need to mitigate climate change and have embodied that goal 
in a variety of policies. Achieving the state’s climate change miti-
gation goals, such as the 40 by 30 goal, will require replacing a 
 
312. See Peskoe, supra note 275, at 16–17, 24 (discussing FERC’s authority to 
ground decisions in expectations about expected future policy choices). 
313. Clean Energy Standard: REC and ZEC Purchases from NYSERDA, 
NYSERDA, https://perma.cc/QVC9-89VC.  
314. Id. 
315. Auction Results: Allowance Prices and Volumes (by Auction), RGGI, 
https://perma.cc/V4R8-VVTE (indicating that, in Auction 34, held on Decem-
ber 7, 2016, carbon dioxide allowances sold for $3.55).   
316. The EIA estimates that natural-gas-fired generation emits, on average, 1.22 
pounds of carbon dioxide per kWh and bituminous-coal-fired generation 
emits 2.07 pounds of carbon dioxide per kWh. See EIA, supra note 152. We 
multiplied these figures by the RGGI auction clearing price to determine the 
carbon price faced by generators.  
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significant volume of fossil-fueled generation with energy effi-
ciency and zero-emitting resources, which will, in turn, require ex-
panding transmission capacity and making changes to bulk power 
system operations. Planning must begin now if New York and 
NYISO are to minimize the impact of these changes on electric sys-
tem reliability while ensuring continued availability of plentiful 
supplies of electricity at reasonable rates. 
FERC has previously taken steps to improve electric system 
planning, including adopting Order 1000, which requires Trans-
mission Owners “to develop a regional transmission plan that re-
flects the evaluation of whether alternative regional solutions may 
be more efficient or cost-effective” than local solutions.317 Specifi-
cally, Order 1000 requires Transmission Owners seeking to de-
velop new transmission facilities to participate in a regional plan-
ning process which: 
1. considers “transmission needs driven by public policy re-
quirements established by” enacted statutes or regula-
tions,318 and allows for consideration of transmission 
needs driven by public policy objectives not codified in ex-
isting laws;319 and 
2. gives “comparable consideration” to transmission and non-
transmission alternatives—a category that includes stor-
age, energy efficiency, distributed energy resources, and 
demand response.320 
Adoption of a NYISO carbon price reflective of state-level pub-
lic policies would promote the same goals as Order 1000, albeit on 
different legal grounds. Specifically, it would embody New York’s 
policies with respect to climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
including those not yet codified, in a way that directly informs bulk 
power system planning—a potentially important corrective, given 
 
317. Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmis-
sion Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,845 
(Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 1000]. 
318. Id.  
319. Id. at 49,878; see also Shelly Welton, Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 481–86 (2015) (describing examples of planning 
pursuant to Order 1000 that fail to realize that Order’s stated aims). 
320. Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,868. 
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the ambition of New York’s 40 by 30 goal321 and the fact that un-
codified policies are often ignored by transmission operators in 
their planning processes.322 
Similarly, a wholesale carbon price would also push in the 
same direction as Order 1000’s “comparable consideration” re-
quirement. This requirement was intended to ensure that invest-
ments in transmission—which are always costly and long-lived—
are not made before due consideration is given to potentially more 
efficient and cost-effective alternative approaches.323 Despite this, 
however, regional transmission planning efforts still typically fo-
cus on how to develop transmission and largely or completely ig-
nore the question of whether non-transmission alternatives might 
contribute to a more optimal solution, either by supplanting trans-
mission facilities or enabling more cost-effective routes or combi-
nations of transmission and alternatives.324 The state’s “Reform-
ing the Energy Vision” initiative, adopted to further progress 
towards the 40 by 30 goal, includes support for energy efficiency, 
distributed generation, and other non-transmission alterna-
tives.325 The NYPSC is working to ensure that retail electricity 
 
321. N.Y. STATE ENERGY PLANNING BD., supra note 1, at 111 (stating that goal of 
energy efficiency reductions of 600 trillion BTU in buildings would mean a 
twenty-three percent reduction by 2030 from a 2012 baseline). 
322. See, e.g., WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 258, at 36 (finding that “[w]hile 
some transmission operators have voluntarily elected to consider additional 
policy objectives not codified in existing laws and regulations, most have 
not”). But see CDP, supra note 242, at 40 (indicating that some electric util-
ities have begun considering “the potential future policy and regulatory risk 
associated with carbon [dioxide] emissions” in their planning processes). 
323. Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,851–53; see also Scott Hempling, ‘Non-
Transmission Alternatives’: FERC’s ‘Comparable Consideration’ Needs Cor-
rection, ELEC. POL’Y 9 (2013), https://perma.cc/SKR5-TY8S (“It is not pru-
dent for a public utility not to consider all feasible alternatives. The costs 
that emerge from an imprudent process—one that ignores alternatives—
cannot be reasonable costs.”).   
324. Welton, supra note 319, at 481–86 (illustrating with examples how Order 
1000 has failed to realize its stated aims); Interview by Marta Monti with 
Allen Gleckner, Humphrey Sch. of Pub. Affairs, Univ. of Minn. 10–11 (June 
16, 2015), https://perma.cc/LRT5-HPCB (“[A] problem with transmission 
planning nation-wide is how non-transmission alternatives are looked at . . . 
. Right now there are a few different wonky reasons why it’s not being fully 
looked at on a level playing field with the transmission proposals.”). 
325. Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy 
Vision: Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework and Implementation 
Plan, Case No. 14-M-0101 at 10–11 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 26, 2015). 
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markets operate in a way that is consistent with and furthers in-
vestment in these alternatives.326 A wholesale carbon price would 
reflect this purpose by pushing stakeholders to more thoroughly 
examine non-transmission alternatives.327 
3. Carbon Prices Aligned to Arguments 1 and 2 
Parts 1 and 2 above present various arguments in support of 
carbon pricing in NYISO. Design of the pricing scheme and the 
pricing level depends heavily on which of those arguments NYISO 
relies upon: 
• Argument 1(a), which emphasizes the need to internalize 
carbon externalities to improve wholesale market compet-
itiveness, logically corresponds to a carbon price based on 
the SCC. As explained in Part A, the SCC is an approxi-
mation of the damage to social welfare resulting from car-
bon dioxide emissions. Its use would, therefore, ensure 
that the external costs of emissions from fossil fuel gener-
ation are reflected in electricity prices, which, in our view, 
is necessary to level the playing field for non-fossil genera-
tors and thus improve the functioning of wholesale mar-
kets. 
• Argument 1(b), which focuses on the costs fossil fuel gener-
ation imposes on the electric system, e.g., in terms of re-
duced reliability, would not justify adoption of a carbon 
price based on the SCC. As the SCC is a measure of the 
economy-wide cost of carbon dioxide emissions, its use 
would overstate the reliability and other electric system 
costs of such emissions. We are not aware of an analysis 
that traces cost causation from generators to end-users, 
but we are confident that it could be done by examining 
carefully the effects on reliability and resiliency of partic-
ular fuel and facility types.328 
 
326. Id. 
327. Cf. NYISO, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES ROADMAP FOR NEW YORK’S 
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS (DRAFT) (2016), https://perma.cc/Y87U-
UVBG.  
328. For a discussion of service reliability studies, see MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN ET 
AL., ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., UPDATED VALUE OF 
SERVICE RELIABILITY ESTIMATES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY CUSTOMERS IN THE 
U.S. (2015), https://perma.cc/6M6Y-6KDA.   
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• Argument 2, which emphasizes the need to improve short- 
and long-run electric system planning, would arguably jus-
tify use of a price derived from the SCC as the basis for a 
scheme that harmonizes various state-level public policies. 
Underlying this argument is a concern that current and 
future state policies aimed at addressing climate change 
will necessitate a shift away from carbon-intensive gener-
ation. NYISO’s adoption of a carbon pricing scheme de-
rived from the SCC, which is already a touchstone for New 
York public policy, would help ensure that market partici-
pants plan for that shift now. 
B. A NYISO Carbon Price Would Not Be Unduly 
Discriminatory 
FERC cannot approve a utility tariff that it finds to be unduly 
discriminatory in the sense of “grant[ing] any undue preference or 
advantage to any person or subject[ing] any person to any undue 
prejudice or disadvantage or . . . maintain[ing] any unreasonable 
difference in rates.”329 This was historically assessed on a cus-
tomer-specific basis, with FERC requiring utilities to offer like 
rates, calculated on a cost-of-service basis, to all similarly situated 
customers.330 More recently, with the shift to market-based rates, 
FERC has undertaken a broader inquiry, focusing on whether mar-
ket conditions are discriminatory. As Eisen has observed, 
“[i]nstead of judging whether an individual firm’s action is . . . dis-
criminatory, [FERC] decides whether features of the wholesale 
markets’ operation contribute to [this] effect.”331 
Some commentators have suggested that a carbon pricing 
scheme could be viewed as discriminatory.332 Peskoe, for example, 
has noted that opponents of carbon pricing may argue that it favors 
some generators over others.333 We recognize, as Peskoe does, that 
carbon pricing will necessarily treat generators differently based 
 
329. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b). 
330. Eisen, supra note 275, at 1812. 
331. Id. 
332. See, e.g., Peskoe, supra note 275, at 26. 
333. Id. (stating that “opponents of carbon adder may argue that an adder would 
be contrary to FERC’s long-standing policy of not favoring particular types 
of electric generation”).  
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on their emissions profiles.334 This is because, while the same car-
bon price would be applied to all generating units, regardless of 
technology, the resulting carbon fee would differ based on each 
unit’s emissions.335 Some may, therefore, view carbon pricing as 
supporting renewable generating units at the expense of fossil fuel 
power plants. That is not necessarily the case, however. Some re-
newable generators (e.g., using biofuels) produce emissions which 
would be subject to carbon pricing. Those generators would face a 
higher carbon fee than fossil fuel plants with low or zero emissions 
(e.g., clean coal facilities). 
Even though it applies different fees to each generator, in our 
view, carbon pricing does not violate the prohibition on undue dis-
crimination in the FPA. Differential treatment is permitted under 
the FPA if FERC “offer[s] a valid reason for the disparity . . . 
[which is related] to the achievement of permissible policy 
goals.”336 With respect to a carbon price, NYISO may argue that 
disparate treatment of low- and high-carbon generators is neces-
sary to improve the functioning of wholesale electricity markets, a 
long-accepted policy goal. A similar argument, albeit in a different 
context, was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Wisconsin Public Power, Inc. v. FERC 
(“WPP”).337 That case involved a FERC decision exempting certain 
transmission providers from compliance with MISO’s OATT on the 
basis that they provided services under contracts predating 
MISO’s formation.338 The court noted that FERC’s decision “was in 
some loose sense discriminatory,” as the exempt providers were not 
subject to certain fees levied on others and could schedule services 
on short notice with greater flexibility.339 The court concluded, 
however, that the discrimination was not undue, as it was neces-
sary to solve a specific problem in the market, stating: 
 
334. Id. (noting that “[a] carbon adder . . . is essentially a payment from owners 
of emitting resources to owners of emission-free resources. By definition, 
such a fee discriminates. Whether that discrimination is ‘undue’ is a sepa-
rate matter.”).  
335. See supra Part VI. 
336. Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
337. Wis. Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 493 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
338. Id. at 249. 
339. Id. at 274. 
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MISO’s development was complicated by the existence of several 
hundred pre-existing bilateral contracts between its transmission 
owners and other utilities. These long-term contracts, known as 
grandfathered agreements (GFAs), obligated the transmission 
owners to provide transmission service under terms and rates that 
were inconsistent with the OATT. . . . The tension between GFA 
terms and practices on the one hand and the MISO Tariff on the 
other hand was from the very beginning a “fundamental problem 
in the proposed design and operation” of MISO. . . . [The] discrim-
ination [complained of] was inherent in the solution to [that] prob-
lem.340 
A carbon price would also address a fundamental problem in 
the design and operation of wholesale electricity markets. As ex-
plained above, the problem arises from the failure of markets to 
accurately value low- and high-carbon sources of electricity, which 
impairs competition. This problem is particularly acute in NYISO 
markets, which have been further distorted by state laws that im-
pose diverse carbon prices on some but not all market participants. 
Extending carbon pricing to all participants would remedy this dis-
tortion. To the extent that this results in differential treatment of 
participants, it is “inherent in the solution” to the problem at hand 
and, thus, not undue under the test articulated in WPP. 
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that those ben-
efiting from the extension of carbon pricing account for a relatively 
small share of generation. The key beneficiaries of carbon pricing 
are, of course, zero-carbon generating units. Most of those units 
already have their zero-carbon attributes valued through New 
York’s CES. The remaining zero-carbon generators serve a rela-
tively small share of electricity load. This is significant as, in WPP, 
the court emphasized that the limited extent of discrimination sug-
gested it was not undue.341 In that case, those benefiting from the 
discriminatory practices accounted for approximately ten percent 
of peak load.342 
 
340. Id. at 249, 270, 274. 
341. Id. at 274 (noting that “the extent of discrimination was relatively small and 
not ‘undue’”). 
342. Id. at 270. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
In response to federal and state policies aimed at limiting the 
electricity sector’s carbon dioxide emissions, several ISO/RTOs 
have commenced reviews into whether and how to price carbon in 
wholesale energy markets. With some notable exceptions, emis-
sions are not currently priced in wholesale markets but rather 
treated as externalities. This results in a mismatch between the 
price and cost of fossil fuel generation, which leads to higher levels 
of such generation than are socially optimal. To correct this market 
failure and equalize prices with costs, an ISO/RTO could include a 
carbon fee reflecting each generator’s emissions profile in its bids 
into the wholesale market. By causing high-emitting generators, 
such as coal- and oil-fired units, to be dispatched less frequently, 
this would provide an incentive for investment in cleaner generat-
ing options and in non-transmission alternatives like energy effi-
ciency or demand response. 
Although the carbon pricing scheme we propose is conceptu-
ally simple, its implementation would raise numerous and complex 
issues. In the New York context, for example, any carbon pricing 
scheme proposed by NYISO would have to be integrated with 
RGGI. Thus, after determining a carbon fee for each generator—a 
difficult task in itself—NYISO would need to adjust that fee to ex-
clude the cost of RGGI allowances. NYISO would also need to re-
solve whether the fee should accommodate or displace Tier 3 of the 
CES. 
NYISO’s proposed carbon pricing scheme would be subject to 
review by FERC. This Article argued that a carbon price could be 
justified as a means of improving the functioning of wholesale mar-
kets to ensure just and reasonable rates. While we view this as 
fully consistent with the law and with long-standing FERC prac-
tice, we note that it would push the boundaries of what has been 
done in the past. A more modest approach would see carbon pricing 
used solely to reflect and harmonize state-level policies aimed at 
reducing electricity sector emissions. 
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